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Military Affairs

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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-88-017

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Collegium on Afghan Veterans' 'Interests'

Benefits Violations Debated

LD1507053088 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 1500 GMT 13 Jul 88

[Text] A meeting of the collegium took place today under the chairmanship of Sukharev, the USSR procurator general, to discuss questions of ensuring the rights and legitimate interests of internationalist servicemen and the execution of the recent decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers concerning military servicemen who have fulfilled their international duty in Afghanistan. Taking part in the meeting were senior officials of the USSR Defense Ministry, the RSFSR Ministry of Housing and Municipal services, and the All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans.

The debate concerned facts of heartlessness and serious violations of legislation covering benefits for internationalist servicemen and also red tape and parochial distortions exposed in a number of regions of the country during checks on the fulfillment of this legislation conducted by the USSR procuracy with the participation of military procurators.

The executive committees of many local soviets of people's deputies have shown weakness in monitoring the fulfillment of this legislation. Questions of granting benefits are frequently being tackled only on statements by servicemen or on applications from military registration and enlistment offices. The military registration and enlistment offices are conducting work in a weak manner to acquaint Afghan servicemen with the legislation on benefits.

Ignorance of the legislation has quite frequently caused officials not to be satisfied with the servicemen's well-grounded applications. They have been unlawfully refused places on lists for the allocation of housing or improvements in housing conditions. This sort of thing happened, for example, in the executive committees of the Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tyube, and Fayzabad Soviets of People's Deputies of the Tajik SSR and certain areas of Leningrad [as heard, presumably means Leninabad] and Ashkhabad. Instances of unfounded refusal to grant benefits to the families of servicemen who died in Afghanistan have also been noted.

Based on the materials of the procuracy, measures have been taken to eliminate the infringements. A number of officials have had disciplinary proceedings taken against them and a number have been issued with warnings.

Certain individual officials have had criminal proceedings instituted against them for instances of a bureaucratic and criminally negligent attitude toward the execution of their service duties.

Procurator General Interviewed

LD1507224588 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Jul 88

[Excerpts] [Announcer] A session of the collegium of the USSR procuracy, at which questions of ensuring the rights and legitimate interests of internationalist servicemen and the execution of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on servicemen who have fulfilled their international duty in Afghanistan, took place today. Here is what Aleksandr Yakovlevich Sukharev, the USSR procurator general, said in an interview with Anatoliy Fedorov, our correspondent:

[Begin recording] [Fedorov] Aleksandr Yakovlevich, 5 and 1/2 years have passed since the well-known decree was adopted. It was a great, humane act by the government for people who have passed through the furnace of combat operations and a matter of great political and international resonance. So, how do you assess progress in the implementation of that decree?

[Sukharev] If we are going to talk on a large scale, when we begin to apply the demands of our legislation, so to speak, to the actual person, to the actual serviceman who has passed through the furnace of those trials, sometimes disappointment sets in. That is to say, as for what these people, their families, and even their comrades are authorized by law, there are failures, as we say, in letting them get what they are authorized by law to have, you realize. A particularly acute situation has developed in this country with regard to privileges for housing. Some executive committees have engaged in ad-libbing, establishing a special system, you understand, registration arrangements, in other words, which actually differ in no way from the general order; and in some places they have established a system for after 3 or 4 years' residence in the given locality. [passage omitted]

Very many shocking things have been ascertained with regard to medical services and the payment of pensions to them and to the families of those who perished.

[Fedorov] Is it time for you to apply the law against those bureaucrats who, by means fair or foul, are throwing a wrench in the works and degrading people who have gone through the war, we shall call it—has the time come?

[Sukharev] Without a doubt. We have given instructions to initiate criminal proceedings against individual bureaucrats and officials who have dealt heartlessly with the needs of servicemen, and to conduct special investigations. Of course we have sent very strict representations to ministries and departments, demanding that they give a report on how they are going to correct these shortcomings which have been uncovered, in order for our laws to be effective in practice.

[Fedorov] Aleksandr Yakovlevich, how do you evaluate the fact that the relevant documents of the legislation adopted in 1983 and 1984, on the privileges of internationalist servicemen, and the order of Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov, the then minister of defense, are stamped Top Secret? This means, in practice, that of the executive bodies which are supposed to know and implement these documents, many do not know them fully, and the servicemen themselves do not know them.

[Sukharev] I see no grounds for keeping that stamp in force. It must be said that this is also an indicator of the period of stagnation, and an end must be put to it as soon as possible. Everybody must know our laws, especially when we are dealing with such humane laws as those on privileges for internationalists, for participants in combat operations, for our defenders. [end recording]

**Readers Question KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
Editorial Policies Under Glasnost**
*18010372 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Apr 88 Second Edition p 2*

[Letters to the editor under the "From the Mail of the 'Express Analysis'" rubric]

[Excerpts]

Not for the Sake of "Roasted Facts"

I follow the press closely and I am coming to the conclusion that the process of democratization is entering the next phase and we readers are starting to get used to the fact that the newspapers today are "printing everything."

In the current stage of perestroika, just the information and agitation functions of the press are satisfying the reader less and less. On the other hand, of more concern is something else—what changed after the publication? In politics, the economy, culture and human interrelationships. We readers want to see an organizer and fighter in the newspaper.... People do not need glasnost for the sake of glasnost. You can no longer surprise anyone with "roasted facts." Glasnost is needed so we can move forward.

I propose to the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA staff that it begin with a little simple arithmetic. First count how much critical material you print, then the amount of reports published on measures taken with respect to this material. Compare the figures you obtain.... Such a comparison makes me, a reader, think: do not some of the newspaper's articles amount, in a manner of speaking, merely to "letting off steam"? This depends, of course, not only on newspaper people but also on those who are called upon to react to the printed word in a businesslike manner. But you must also strive more actively to see that it is effective. Otherwise, at times some of your publications under the rubric "After the

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Article" are simply disappointing. It is clear from them that many "heroes" of critical articles get off, let us be frank, with a light scare.

Capt Yu. Ganin

In the Role of a Procurer

Not often, but sometimes you write about the so-called "earnings" of military personnel in civilian enterprises: the principle "you help me and I help you" is still valid. Just visit the commander's office, dining room or barracks and by their interior you can easily determine what kind of specialization the industrial enterprises in the district have.

Judging by the conclusions that you draw in such articles, the main culprits of these—let us say it right out—disgraces are the commanders of units and subunits. But are you not dissembling here? I myself was once a regular officer and I know: evil comes "from above." "Seek and procure!"—there it is, the "material security" of the orders issued by some senior directors. And in construction through the "scrounging method" and the resolution of problems in social and cultural life. The cost of the reequipment of the Lenin rooms alone is quite high. Whenever the chief comes, there is a new directive. And how much does the political deputy get for this? So you either have to pass the hat for the officers or "go for earnings" to eat.

I. Ostashevskiy, Kalinin

A Secret From Whom?

The newspapers are now printing readers' suggestions and raising problems about which one formerly simply did talk aloud, not to mention publish them. My question is of the kind that until recently was not "for the press" but today, in my opinion, not only can it be published but it must. I cannot understand why in an open press they do not publish some edicts of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the awarding of titles of Hero of the Soviet Union. A warrior has performed a deed and they award him the Hero's Gold Star. Often there was not a word heard on the day of the issuance of the edict on this. Time passes and they give him the award publicly, at the very highest level. Television shows it and the newspapers publish essays on the hero.

One asks, what is the sense of the "secret" edict in the case at hand? From whom is this secret?

Yu. Shadrin, Ivanovo.

Edifying the "Grandfathers"

They have recently begun to write more often about non-regulation relationships. I myself was a regular officer in the recent past, so I know about them not from

hearsay and not from the pages of newspapers. For this reason, it was with particular attention that I read A. Khorev's article "Beyond the Black Line" in the 6 February issue. I do not know your rules but if I were in the author's position I would set the letter of A. Kozlov presented in the article not in small type that is difficult to read but in huge letters.

I am far from the naive thought that such a form of agitation will eradicate dedovshchina... It is one thing when commanders, political officers and activists speak about their inadmissibility and another thing when this is done by those who themselves have violated the law and received their condign punishment. Such bitter confessions of former "barracks hooligans" are a good lesson for those who still allow themselves to trample on the laws of military comradeship.

M. Shakirov, Zapolyarnyy in Murmansk Oblast

And Who Are We?

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA writes quite a lot about little-known pages of military history but unfortunately many pages in the postwar development of our armed forces

have not yet been illuminated. How, let us say, the nuclear-missile shield of our Motherland was established at the end of the 1940's and beginning of the 1950's. I acknowledge that I am an interested person in this regard. For during the time of my service in those distant years, I myself happened to participate in the tests of the first models of nuclear weapons.

For a long time, of course, much could not be told. But now it would also be possible to do justice to those who did not spare their efforts, and at times their health, for the sake of strengthening the defensive capability of the Motherland.

After the accident in Chernobyl, everyone realized especially acutely what an insidious and dangerous enemy radiation is. Those who distinguished themselves there, in Chernobyl, are certainly heroes, people worthy of all respect. But who am I and people like me?

V. Iskov, village of Mokrets in Khmel'nitskaya Oblast

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Warsaw Pact Defensive Principles Reviewed
PM2906135088 Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN
in English No 10, May 88 pp 5-8

[Aleksandr Savelyev article: "Debate on Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine in USSR and Socialist Pluralism"]

[Text] A year has passed since the publication of a document "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member-States," which sparked off a lively debate in Soviet military, political and scientific circles.

The proclaimed defensive principles of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact military doctrines have provoked a spate of controversial studies. The interpretation of some provisions and the doctrine as a whole also causes controversy. Some people say that the Soviet and Warsaw Pact doctrines are well balanced and require no changes, while others argue that the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries have just taken first steps towards making the structure of their armed forces strictly defensive and "non-provocative."

Some experts, such as Marshal Viktor Kulikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Warsaw Pact Forces, and General Anatoliy Gribkov, chief of staff of the Joint Warsaw Pact Forces, believe that the Soviet military doctrine has always been defensive and that it was just time to publish it.

Others, such as Rear Admiral V. Gulin and Captain I. Kondyrev, say that in the changed situation the Soviet doctrine aims not only at repelling the aggressor but also preventing a war.

"The military might of a state or coalition of states should be maintained at a level that would give no one any reason for fear, even imaginary, for one's security," Dr. Lev Semeyko writes. "It is not enough to declare one's doctrine defensive, the way NATO did. One should confirm the defensive orientation of one's doctrine by the size and deployment of one's troops, their structure and armaments and military activities. Without this declarations would be merely declarations."

Speaking about the military aspect of the Soviet doctrine, Dr. Semeyko notes that "the specific characteristics of the military potential should confirm defensive (non-offensive, non-aggressive) orientation of military doctrines and, at the same time, ensure effective security."

Andrey Kokoshin, corresponding member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, believes that the reduction in the size of troops and armaments is not enough and that there is a need to make fundamental changes in them to preclude surprise attack or offensive operations.

Scientists believe that a great deal is to be done to make the military and technical parts of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet doctrines correspond their political part. This requires a restructuring of the armed forces.

However, the problem of restructuring the armed forces also causes divergence of opinion. Some specialists, especially civilian, believe that this problem should be resolved as soon as possible. The same view is held by some representatives of the Soviet defense Ministry.

Analysing prospects for the reduction of troops and armaments, Maj.-Gen. V. Tatarnikov writes that "further cuts and changes in the armed forces should create a situation where the sides would have what is just enough for defense and not enough for offensive operations."

Col.-Gen. Nikolay Chervov, chief of a General Staff Administration, agrees with this view: "The military potential of the two groupings (...) should be reduced and the structures of their armed forces should be re-organised so that neither side could attack or conduct offensive operations."

Gen. Ivan Tretyak, commander-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces, represents a different trend of opinion: "Any changes in our Army should be considered a thousand times over before they are decided upon. Temporary benefits are a great lure. But I repeat once again—the most important thing is to have a reliable defense. If we were not so strong, imperialism would not hesitate to change the world. The principle of sufficient defense is unshakable. We must have as much force as is necessary effectively to guarantee the security of the USSR and its allies."

Defense and offence and the relationship between these two types of military action occupy an important place in the discussion of the military doctrine. Some authors believe that the Soviet Union should completely renounce offence and restructure its armed forces for strictly defensive purposes. Others say that a combination of offence and defense is the main means of repelling aggression.

In the first group are civilian analysts, such as Andrey Kokoshin and Vitaliy Zhurkin. "The chief method of action of the Soviet Armed Forces in repelling aggression will be defensive operations and combat actions rather than offensive operations," Andrey Kokoshin writes.

Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov shares this point of view: "Our military doctrine is strictly defensive and its only objective is to prevent war, nuclear or conventional. We therefore declare that we shall never be the first to use nuclear weapons and propose that conventional forces should be built strictly in accordance with the principle of reasonable sufficiency, that is for defense only."

Military experts believe that complete renunciation of offensive actions is impossible. Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov said that though the defensive military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact was designed only to repel the military threat, that did not mean the Soviet actions would be passive.

Another controversial issue is how the military doctrine is related to the concept of "deterrence".

A number of experts regard attachment to nuclear deterrence as a manifestation of conservative mentality, while others advocate the principle of maintaining parity at the level of "reasonable sufficiency".

defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov claims that NATO's concept of "nuclear deterrence" has nothing to do with defense. "This concept dates back to the cold war era and is contradictory and dangerous," he writes. "There is no logic in saying that a nuclear conflict would be a catastrophe for all and at the same time demanding that nuclear weapons should say as a means of safeguarding

peace. The NATO concept blocs the efforts to resolve the nuclear weapons problem. It encourages the arms race, leads to a further stockpiling of lethal weapons, makes military balance fragile and increases the risk of nuclear war."

The Soviet defense minister admits, however, that nuclear deterrence remains the foundation of the Soviet Union's security, guaranteeing effective retaliation in the event of the use of weapons of mass destruction by the United States. It appears that all leading Soviet military experts agree with this view.

As regards the principles of ensuring security and stability in a world free from nuclear weapons, few Soviet experts can say anything definite on this score. Academician Yevgeniy Primakov believes that after the elimination of nuclear weapons stability in the world should be maintained by political and legal means, including international law, while military means should rest upon the principle of what is reasonably sufficient for repelling an attack.

NATO Response to Arms Initiatives Criticized

PM2007154988 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Jul 88 First Edition p 3

["Military-Political Review" by Captain First Rank V. Kuzar: "Confidence- and Security-Building in Europe"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] From the rostrum of the Polish Sejm M.S. Gorbachev called on the leaders of all European countries to hold a meeting to discuss a single question: the practical reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe. Yes, an all-European Reykjavik is needed; a breakthrough is needed on this key element of European security. Substantial progress in the political, economic, and other spheres can hardly be expected without achieving concrete results here. Why? A "European home" cannot be built on weapons arsenals, which are constantly being restocked with new, more powerful, and more accurate varieties. Especially with a continent that is saturated with nuclear power stations, conventional weapons are now, figuratively speaking, being turned into nuclear weapons. One missile carrying a conventional warhead or even a powerful artillery shell is enough to throw a death-dealing radioactive cloud over a nuclear power station. This danger is extremely real and, naturally, cannot fail to undermine trust between European countries.

Soviet proposals on the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces and confidence-building measures on an all-European scale were once again voiced in Warsaw. The USSR proposes that this process be implemented in three stages. In the first stage it proposes the disclosure and elimination of all the imbalances and asymmetries between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in both the numerical strength of troops and basic arms and individual regions of the continent. It proposes that talks begin with an exchange and thorough verification [proverka] of initial data, including by on-site inspections. In the second phase it proposes that the NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces be reduced by 500,000 men on each side by disbanding formations and units and eliminating their standard-issue arms. The third phase is to continue the reduction in armed forces in order to eventually impart an exclusively defensive character to them. The Soviet Union is prepared from the very start of reductions to come to an agreement on priority reductions in tactical nuclear weapons, aircraft, and tanks. In an effort to seek balance in every specific case by reducing military confrontation, the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to withdraw its comparable aircraft systems from forward-based sites in Eastern Europe if NATO does not deploy in Italy the 72 U.S. fighter-bombers which Spain has rejected. The implementation of another Soviet proposal—the creation of a unified center to lessen the military danger as an area for NATO-Warsaw Pact cooperation—would also promote the reduction of tension on the European Continent. Poland is ready to site such a center on its territory.

The new Soviet initiatives are consonant with the proposals from other socialist countries aimed at ensuring security in our "European home." They also include the comprehensive Polish plan for arms reduction and confidence-building in central Europe, a plan that is well known as the "Jaruzelski Plan," and the initiative on the creation of a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the line where the Warsaw Pact and NATO meet, which was put forward by M. Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee.

The new initiatives put forward in the course of M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Poland and in the course of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee session have aroused a broad wave of interest and approval. Everyone who shows sincere concern for the fate of both the European Continent and the entire planet sees them and supports them. They are at the center of attention for politicians, public figures, and foreign countries' mass media.

In this connection, the following question is quite natural: What is the reaction of the people to whom these initiatives are primarily addressed—the NATO military-political leadership—to these initiatives? All the indications are that it is negative. This conclusion is self-evident when you acquaint yourself with the first statements made by official NATO spokesmen and Western newspapers' commentaries on this subject.

Thus France's LE MONDE, in reference to the USSR's new proposals, says that NATO "has shown no interest either in holding a meeting between the leaders of the European states or in reducing conventional arms, or in symmetrically withdrawing combat aircraft from the continent." A NATO Headquarters communique indicates that the Soviet initiatives were noted, but there was soon a rush to reject them. The Atlanticists have not even taken the trouble to attentively and comprehensively study the new proposals or think about seeking mutually acceptable options in the interests of reducing the number of modern warfare systems sited in Europe and reducing military confrontation on the continent.

What is the worth, for instance, of the statement concerning the Soviet initiatives made by M. Woerner, recently appointed NATO secretary general. While hypocritically stating that the West is interested in creating stable equilibrium at the lowest possible level, he asserts without foundation that this is being impeded by Soviet superiority in Europe. Or take the pseudoargument used by people within NATO in their quest to justify their nonacceptance of the Soviet proposals. People there claim that air forces do not lend themselves to reductions owing to the verification [proverka] difficulties which allegedly crop up when aircraft base sites are changed rapidly. This approach to the proposals from one side unequivocally illustrates the other side's unwillingness to display common sense and conduct constructive talks.

The NATO military-political leadership is still a slave to the stereotypes of the prenuclear age. It is increasingly endeavoring to rattle the saber, and is every time adamantly opposed to any attempt to secure arms reduction. Clearly expressing the will of the NATO leaders, London's FINANCIAL TIMES hastened to silence Italian Prime Minister C. De Mita, stating that his support for the reciprocal withdrawal of aircraft is allegedly premature. Corresponding words of warning are also heard from across the ocean. R. Lehman, U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, recently formulated the essence of these warnings: "The Soviet Union under Gorbachev challenges U.S. and Western interests and this requires that we be vigilant.... We must not reduce the military potential of the United States and its allies on the basis of Soviet public statements.... As for NATO, we must continue to implement our initiative to perfect conventional arms and the programs arising from the resolution adopted in Montebello in 1983...."

Decisions are being adopted in NATO under pressure from the opponents of a secure and nonviolent world and in complete accordance with their views aimed at further building up military preparations and improving strategy and tactics for use of troops. Thus, General J. Galvin, NATO supreme allied commander Europe, stated that he will continue to strive to ensure that the alliance has an opportunity to maneuver and destroy enemy forces even before they enter into combat operations. The general spoke positively of the "follow-on forces attack" concept, which, as is well known, is of a clearly aggressive character.

NATO is creating a multinational operational formation for operations on the bloc's northern flank. It is made up of U.S., Canadian, and West German troops. There is no

need to particularly stress the danger of this decision and its obvious thrust against the well-known Soviet proposals on reducing the level of military confrontation in the north of Europe and transforming this region into a peace zone.

France is holding back from participating in the process of East-West disarmament and detente, L'HUMANITE notes. The newspaper draws this conclusion on the basis of recent statements made by Defense Minister J.-P. Chevenement, confirming that a law recently adopted on military programs for the years 1987-1991 will not be revised. Thus, the orientation toward building up nuclear, chemical, and conventional systems remains in force. New nuclear-powered submarines carrying a new type of missile and Mirage 2000-N's equipped with ASMP [air-to-surface] nuclear cruise missiles are to come into service.

Nonetheless I would like to hope that NATO's first negative reaction to the latest Warsaw Pact proposals will not be the last, and that reason will prevail. At any rate the statements by the leaders of certain NATO countries give definite grounds for such hopes.

"We see a Europe in the future where West and East no longer bristle with weapons directed against one another but, on the contrary, derive unprecedented benefit from exchanging goods and values, skills and knowledge, people and ideals." Everyone who values the cause of peace on earth is prepared to subscribe to these words uttered by M.S. Gorbachev in the Polish Sejm. Only mutual trust and the restriction of armed forces to exclusively defensive purposes can ensure universal security. The swords that have not yet been beaten into ploughshares must remain sheathed.

Results of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA'S On-Going Readers' Survey

18010377 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Apr 88 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Article from the department for letters and mass work: "We Will Be Mutually Frank": Readers on KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: Comments, Opinions, Advice"]

[Text] It is really true: there are as many opinions as there are people, including with respect to the "Express Analysis" itself. There are "pros" but there are also "cons." Lt Col A. Savinkin from Moscow and L. Toch-kova from Barnaul, although separated by thousands of kilometers, think pretty much alike about the poll being carried out by the editor's office. "It is necessary not to demand it of the readers but for you yourself to raise 'large-scale problems of public relevance' and to give 'opinions and judgments on the basic problems in our life and service.'" This thought of the Muscovite is continued by his kindred spirit from the Altay: "Are you hoping that they will suggest to you subjects and addresses? I fear that you are thereby demonstrating your journalistic helplessness."

We do not intend to prove the contrary. For the sake of fairness, however, we cannot deprive those who think otherwise of their say. Thus, for example, retired Capt G. Khalitov from Bashkiriya: "The newspaper is issued for readers and the editor's office, having lost contact with them, is capable only of a 'stillborn' newspaper. To inspire life in it, it is necessary to know the opinion of the readers and, the main thing, to take that opinion into account." Lt Col V. Bryukhovetskiy considers the "Express Analysis" a "useful start."

That same point of view is shared by Lt Col D. Kostenko and ninth-grader Eduard Malinauskas from Lithuania. Capt Yu. Galin went further: he is proposing a more complex but also more accurate system for learning what readers think. He called it a "referendum." Retired Lt Col V. Kartsev gave a compliment but with a shade of reproach after reading our last review "I will tell you right out..." in the 1 April issue: "It is the first time that 'Zvezdochka' has been frank. We will be mutually frank in the future as well." And we will conclude this review with a sentence written with youthful zeal by the 20-year-old military school student B. Aleshkin: "It is a shame that very many do not participate in the 'Express Analysis.' Is 690 really a good number" (that is how many responded to the February issue—editor).

Indeed, is this really a good number? It is a drop in the bucket of subscribers. In case you noticed, this number has now become even smaller—512. What is this, a decline in interest in the "Express Analysis?" Or of interest in the newspaper? We are very much counting on the fact that the readers will help us "straighten out the question marks."

Is that possible?

Some readers, among them retired Col G. Chuchkalov from Dnepropetrovsk, K. Glukhov from Kostroma and V. Ilyin from Moscow, as if in concert, stated the unexpected idea: young people are losing interest in reading, in serious reading in particular. This process, they think, did not begin yesterday, so that among those "who do not like to read" are many people who are no longer youthful by any means. Our expert readers see the only way out in raising the quality and attractiveness of newspaper materials and the problems they cover. But the attractiveness, they warn, should not be at the expense of "roasted" facts.

Among those those filled out the third item in the questionnaire, 14 percent stated that they were completely satisfied with the March materials, 41 percent were mostly satisfied, 37 percent were mostly dissatisfied, and 2 percent completely dissatisfied. Satisfaction, partial or complete, is expressed mainly by readers who either left the army ranks long ago or have not yet served in the army. Significantly more critical are regular officers, ensigns, and warrant officer, and the editor's office has more reason to put higher demands on itself than it does to be reassured.

Thus, to what did our readers give preference in the March block of newspapers? "I had already decided, this is it, I am not going to subscribe to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA any longer. But in March I changed my mind. Because of three articles—'A Special Task' by Capt 1st Rank S. Bystrov, 'Order No 227' by Col V. Filatov, and 'Reading About Stalin...' by A. Khorev," writes reserve Maj A. Zayets from Dnepropetrovsk, a "steady and now, perhaps, a lifelong subscriber to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA."

Precisely these three articles received the most positive responses, at the same time evoking different opinions. The "prize-winning" articles are followed by the interview "History Cannot Stand Vanity" (published 29 March) and the articles "With a Dream and Bravery" (by Lt Col A. Ladin, published 26 March), "A Love Stronger Than Granite" (Ye. Agapova, 8 March), "The Soldier's Star" (Lt Col I. Yesyutin, 13 March), "To the South of Pyandzh" (Capt 3rd Rank S. Ishchenko, 27 March), "The 625th Did Not Return to the Airfield..." (Col M. Rebrov, 25 March), and "Looking the Truth in the Eyes" (Lt Col N. Belan, 4 March).

Our experts touch on many subjects. As for one subject, however, it would be incorrect to say that they only touch on it. Readers are striving literally to delve into it, and as deeply as they can. This subject is perestroika.

As the mail for "Express Analysis" indicates, the process of perestroika in the army—as everywhere, by the way—is not simple. Readers are asking themselves: why? We have to confess that we journalists most often face a rough road in illuminating this complex subject. And only our joint efforts—of those who read and write—

help us free ourselves from the conservative habits of the past, to separate the seed from the weeds and to grow the tree of our tomorrow from this seed.

Readers, for example, are disturbed by the questions: How can one combine one-man management, without which the army is unthinkable, with the democratization of army life? How can one combine "the order must be carried out unquestioningly, precisely and promptly" with the renunciation of the "squeezing" style of leadership? Some of our readers raise these questions, believing in changes but not knowing how to accomplish them. They sound rhetorical in the mouths of others: such a combination is impossible, for it loosens the foundations on which the army is built.

If the readers' letters do not fully answer such questions, they do in any event explain how they arise. Lt I. Nikolishin is certain that they arise because in the years of the cult of the personality and later in the period of stagnation Leninist principles for the democratic organization of public life were forced out of the life of our society and out of the consciousness of the people, including out of the atmosphere of army and navy party organizations and out of the relationships between military collectives. The army, of course, has its own specifics: the order must be sacred for every serviceman but it is quite another matter now when, let us say, at the party meeting the command or directive sometimes dominates, which, continues the young officer, kills people's enthusiasm, initiative and creativity and gives rise to passiveness."

As if confirming the correctness of the representative of the young generation, reserve Col N. Borchenko, candidate of historical sciences and lecturer from Poltava, writes: "If one thinks about it, democratic principles are established in the very nature of the Soviet Armed Forces." The space limitations of the newspaper do not permit the stating of all the arguments with which the author of the letter supports what was said above. It remains for us to add that Maj M. Sabeltsev and Sr Lt V. Ryaguzov hold that same position.

But the decision to publish these lines was made not without hesitation: "I am against the granting of the same privileges that we very old men, who have lost our health, have received to the boys returning from Afghanistan. I think that 100 percent of such war veterans as myself will agree with me." We decided to publish them not to cast a shadow on the author of the letter, which, by

the way, is the only one like it in the "Express Analysis." And this is with dozens or hundreds of letters in the opposite "dish of the scale": write more about the internationalist soldiers, their courage, valor and high-mindedness, stigmatize and unmask those whose heartlessness and lack of spirit are more wounding than a bullet.

In publishing these lines from the letter of G. Kubarev, a disabled war veteran from Penza, we want to do even more to accentuate a problem that is already acute.

Several months ago, when our press amicably called on people to face the needs of internationalist warriors, especially in resolving housing questions, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA received a letter from a desperate front line soldier: now we, who have been left nothing with which to live, are even further from getting an apartment.... So let us try to understand Grigoriy Romanovich, four times wounded, twice severely, with contusions, who, having lost his family and home in the war, did not get a well-arranged apartment until 42 years after the Victory.

Both fighting generations—the veterans of the Great Patriotic War and the internationalist warriors—are worthy of the attention and concern of the entire country. And, as many readers think, it is the duty of party, soviet and administrative-economic authorities not to lose sight of this category of people.

The assessment of the newspaper's readers is to some extent an assessment of the army. The suggestions aimed at improving the newspaper are suggestions of ways to strengthen the combat readiness of the armed forces. War veterans P. Yegorov from Syzran and A. Starostenko from Moscow, the reserve and retired officers A. Vodopshin from Belgorod Oblast and V. Salimov from Azerbaijan, the teacher A. Gusev from Leningrad Oblast, kolkhoz workers M. Murtazakulayev from Turkmeniya and V. Kalina from Kuban, the officers V. Vasilenko, D. Korotayev and V. Sadovnikov, and the schoolgirl Zh. Abisheva from Kazakhstan write about many things. But all of them are equally interested in seeing the might of the army invincible, its order precise and discipline strong. It is precisely from these positions that they and other readers view their participation in the "Express Analysis." We expect the interest in the businesslike analysis of the newspaper to continue in coming months as well.

A Storm in a Sea of Paper

18010395a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 May 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank A. Pilipchuk]

[Text] The sailor in charge of expediting lay a file filled with telegrams on the desk of the commander of the submarine unit. The Capt 1st Rank frowned. Having caught my gaze, he said heatedly: "Even when you are at sea you cannot get away from this flow of paperwork..." I asked Vyacheslav Timofeyevich how many documents of various kinds come into the unit, for example, in a year. The figures were staggering. For instance, in 1987 more than 12,000 of them were registered in the staff headquarters.

The current storm in a sea of paper is occurring during a period when the ships are working on their combat exercises for classification. The smoke from the gun powder over the rocket launchers and the barrels of weapons is barely dispersing, the gushers of water over the places where depth charges have been dropped are barely subsiding, and the ship commander is already concerned about the forthcoming preparations for reports. This includes dozens of tactical, firing, and technical indicators fulfilled in the form of formalized report sheets, notifications, blank forms, diagrams of maneuvers, photographs of the screens of firing stations, graphic solutions, deciphered entries of the monitoring and recording equipment, and documents. If one takes into account also that all of the documentation is prepared in several copies, it becomes obvious how labor-intensive such bookkeeping is during the heat of the period of hard military work. It is no wonder that the ship officers make sarcastic statements on the job: "It is not the firing itself that is frightening, but the report that tickles my throat...", "There is no larger caliber of weapon than more paperwork"...

Of course nobody will argue in principle about the need for reports on the combat exercises that have been performed. We are speaking about the extremes of the reasonable, where reporting takes on a life of its own.

The reporting practice that exists today is a byproduct from management according to a large number of indicators. In and of itself it is intended for cumbersome management agencies and a primarily office style of work. That is, it is facing toward the past. Suffice it to say, for example, that through the mine-torpedo department of the Baltic Fleet each year there pass hundreds of reports on firing, rocket and torpedo launches, depth charges, mine placements, and other combat exercises. The rocket-artillery department processes even more paperwork. And yet this is only a part of the work of the aforementioned departments. What kind of depth of analysis of combat training can there be under such conditions? Finely ground flour can be put through a coarse sieve with the same amount of success.

Some time ago in the rocket-artillery arms department the question was posed like this: give us two personal computers and this will allow us to replace seven accountants, and machine accounting will make it possible to place the accumulation of data for analysis on a modern basis. Personal computers have long and persistently been making their way into management agencies and staff offices. But does this in and of itself make it easier for ships' crews when the higher levels are asking for the same numbers and lengths of report documents? It is extremely doubtful.

One time on the initiative of officers of the rocket-artillery arms department, particularly Capt 3d Rank V. Baturin (now studying at the Naval Academy), some of the "blame" was removed from the ship divisions: they were permitted not to send reports to the department on certain artillery firing. But not long ago everything returned to the way it was. The reason? As it was explained to me in the department, supposedly the men on the ships stopped filling them out completely. Of course that means a violation of order. But one must also understand that the people longed to get rid of the paperwork and be excused from the reporting, which had been promised to them at many levels. Half measures, as we can see, will not solve this problem. So to this day the staffs force out reports through arbitrary pressure. One of the telegrams that ended up on the desk of a commander of a submarine division was like a power lever. I remember the body of the telegram almost verbatim: the fleet has now carried out a large part of the planned combat exercises, but only 18 reports have been received. Submitting them late will lead to poor analysis of the combat training and the failure to adopt measures for eliminating shortcomings in special training. And the order part, backed up by a firm signature: make up for these arrears before the established deadline... On the ships they are well aware of what it will cost them if they do not do this—a reduction by one point of the actual evaluation of the exercise that has been performed.

Speaking with the deputy chief of the fleet mine and torpedo department, Capt 2d Rank A. Pronkin, I asked: what did he do in such cases during his days as a flag specialist for the unit? Aleksandr Semenovich answered candidly:

"I persistently made sure that the commanders of mine-torpedo combat units were relieved of watch and charge of quarters for several days and subjected them to 'house arrest' in their cabins until the work on the report was completed...."

In fact, filling out report documentation repeatedly takes commanders of combat units and ships away from essential, sometimes pressing affairs, and from working directly with people. But, after all, it is necessary to report on the firing, it is necessary to provide food for analysis of the possibilities of the weapons and technical

equipment, the training of the rocket, artillery, torpedo, and mine personnel... Where is the solution. What should be the new approaches to the issue raised here?

First of all, many navy officers with whom I have had occasion to discuss this subject think that it is necessary not in words but in reality to grant independence in organizing combat training to commanders of ships and large and smaller units. They should not be fettered by restrictive instructions and they should not be bogged down by formal reports on elementary exercises.

On ships and in staffs of units, divisions, and administrations of the Baltic Fleet I heard the following opinion regarding this: many reports simply have little content and are not especially valuable for extracting instructive experience or accumulating new devices for using arms in combat. They pass uselessly through a long chain: the ship—the unit staff—the corresponding division of the fleet—and the fleet combat training administration, without making any appreciable difference. This pertains above all to the use of certain kinds of small-caliber artillery and antisubmarine weapons. Take, for example, rocket launchers. There is no doubt that in the hands of a tactically mature ship commander, with a distance of several kilometers it is a terrible force. But something else must be taken into account: the existence of many years of practice in depth charge attacks, which has already produced sufficient material for contemplation. Nonetheless, the reports on the given combat exercise remains as bulky as before and is sent to several different recipients. Only the appearance of in-depth analysis is created, but in reality each office is limited, as a rule, to establishing the evaluation for its own area.

Here is another example that was brought up in the staff of one of the units of the fleet. It takes a good deal of time and effort to draw up the reports on the results of artillery firing at shields. Here, in addition to everything else, one must inspect and photograph the shield. And then draw up the document. And there is the conclusion of the chief of the shield station. On the whole, the commander of the combat unit spends many hours on this. "But yet firing at a shield is something out of the past," said the person with whom I was speaking. "For

combat exercises we need a modern target installation, and in the navy not all is well in this respect. But then an in-depth analysis would mean something."

...But for now firing both in a difficult, instructive situation and (let us be candid) in a simple situation involves the same multipage report.

One now hears everywhere bitter statements about the sea of paper, which frequently overflows its boundaries. But the opening of a unified front against it is being delayed. As before, in the local areas there is a fear of going "upstairs" with constructive proposals for reducing the hypertrophied reporting and take some of the responsibility on oneself. Now, when the fleet is at a kind of a turning point, a passive position can lead to throwbacks to the past: attempt to solve new problems by old methods.

We discussed this with the deputy commander of the Baltic Fleet for training as well—the chief of the combat training administration, Rear Adm Ye. Chebanov. He and his deputy that very day happened to be adjusting the drafts of the duties of specialists of the fleet. The fleet is placing great hopes in this adjustment. Specialists in rocket artillery arms, antisubmarine arms, and other specialties will have the opportunity to deal with questions of combat training in an thorough and involved way in the services under their jurisdiction, and train unit specialists and subdivision commanders directly. In the draft of the duties it is pointed out that they are responsible for the "analysis and submission of conclusions from reports on combat exercises that have been performed." It turns out that new duties that have barely been established have inherited the old problem. Does this not mean that all people from their first steps will be doomed to spending a considerable part of their time on paperwork? In a word, the old paperwork style is even crawling into the new forms of management of combat training. How does one stop this process? In the Baltic Fleet, judging from everything, they do not know yet. But perhaps there is experience in this somewhere? How nice it would be to have it in the fleet now!

Missiles Efficiently Eliminated in Saryozek
PM1507145788 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Jul 88 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Ladin, KRASNAYA
ZVEZDA correspondent: "In Line With the Treaty"]

[Text] Work in preparation for eliminating shorter-range missiles is continuing in the Saryozek region (Taldykurgan Oblast) in line with the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The specially trained subunits taking the missiles from the unloading area to the destruction location are working here with precision and efficiency.

Major General L. Bugrov, deputy chief of staff of the Central Asian Military District, who is in charge of the operation, noted that the measures necessary to ensure the steady elimination of the missiles not only in the dry summer period but also in wet autumn weather and winter have been thought through and implemented. Field roads have been put in order. Special concrete areas are being laid to facilitate the siting of cranes and means of transport during unloading.

The actual missile operations base in the Saryozek region has also been transformed in recent months. New hostels and hotels have been built here, two stores and cafes have been commissioned, and additional water sources have been provided. In short, the necessary conditions have been created for U.S. inspectors and also for the personnel engaged in operations to eliminate the missiles.

**Head of New Defense Ministry Agency on
Restructuring in Military Construction**
18010234a Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Mar 88 p 2

[Interview with Col Gen K. Vertelov, chief of the State Board of Examiners and Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Hero of Socialist Labor, winner of Lenin Prize and USSR State Prize, by Capt I. Ivanyuk]

[Text] Questions from KRSNAYA ZVEZDA are answered by the chief of the State Board of Examiners and Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Hero of Socialist Labor, winner of the Lenin Prize and USSR State Prize, Col Gen K. Vertelov.

[Question] In KRSNAYA ZVEZDA mail there are many letters whose authors think that restructuring is proceeding slowly in the military construction units. The readers' concern is largely prompted by the fact that within a year military construction workers will be working under conditions of self-financing. Recently the State Board of Examiners and Inspectorate has conducted a number of large and thorough inspections of the work of military construction organizations, enterprises, and institutions. What have they shown?

[Answer] The main task set for military construction workers can be succinctly formulated as follows: to construct facilities with high quality, within the normative time periods, and without overexpenditure of any kinds of resources.

It should be said that recently capital construction agencies of the Ministry of Defense have been doing a good deal to reduce the number of projects under construction at the same time. For example, according to the title lists of the GlavKEU [Main Housing Operation Administration], for 1988 the concentration of funds on startup objects has been increased by 35 percent as compared to the preceding year. There are positive strides and tendencies in the other armed forces as well.

At the same time the work that has been started is far from complete, and the overall picture here is far from favorable. Thus in the Leningrad, Moscow, and Baltic military districts, in the Pacific Ocean and Northern fleets, and in the Moscow housing administration funds continue to be dispersed among numerous construction projects. On the whole for the Armed Forces the volume of so-called incomplete construction has not decreased and amounts to 116 percent of the normative. The plan for the startup of facilities on the list is regularly not fulfilled.

The year has just begun but already cases of revision of time periods for the release of important facilities because the earmarked volumes have not been balanced with the capabilities of the contracting organizations.

Now about the quality of construction. Not so long ago this question was discussed in the Ministry of Defense. On the plus side, the construction organizations of the Carpathian, Baltic, Odessa, and Belorussian military districts were noted. But it is still impossible to speak of having the construction projects fully meet the requirements of the plans, construction norms, and rules. Suffice it to say that various defects were discovered at every second one of the facilities that were inspected. And it is difficult to expect radical changes for the better here without changing over to the new management conditions.

[Question] One of the most important stages in this changeover is the assimilation of the collective contract. Many specialists warn that the new form of work in and of itself is not a panacea for all problems. Without sharply increasing labor productivity and extensively introducing the achievements of scientific and technical progress no interest in the results will "save" us. What is your view on these problems?

[Answer] Undoubtedly, even with the collective contract it is impossible to achieve significant economic results unless we implement the entire complex of measures directed toward increasing the effectiveness of construction work. This includes the production of modern plans, the introduction of progressive technologies, further growth of industrialization, and the transformation of construction sites into assembly areas as a result of shifting the basic operations to plant conditions. One must not forget about increasing the qualifications of workers and engineers and reducing the level of manual labor either.

Recent inspections in construction administrations of the Leningrad, Belorussian, Moscow, Central Asian, and other military districts have shown that the preparation for the changeover to the new management conditions are perfunctory in nature so far. Five-year plans with a breakdown for the various years are being developed slowly. The work for introducing contractual prices is proceeding slowly. Practically everywhere they are determined from the blueprints, which radically distorts their economic essence. The construction clients have absolutely nothing to do with the development of the list prices for construction products. And it is precisely here that the key to success lies.

The districts and fleets are devoting a clearly inadequate amount of attention to the economics of managing contract construction organizations, the strengthening of their material and technical base, and improvement of social-domestic and housing conditions. Suffice it to say that one-third of them are operating at a loss. The assignments set for 1987 for profit in capital construction as a whole have not been fulfilled.

[Question] But still, what role in the restructuring of the construction complex is played by the "technical" aspect of the matter? Is everything possible being done so that

even in the stage of planning they can realize progressive, effective, and economical solutions? In this connection is it possible to speak of a unified technical policy in capital construction of the USSR Ministry of Defense?

[Answer] One must say that the existing system for the introduction of the achievements of scientific and technical progress is not very effective: production and scientific plans are poorly connected. Still the plan for technical development stipulates that by 1990 it will be necessary to complete no less than one-third of the construction and installation work using new technical equipment and progressive designs and technologies. The level of manual labor will be about 60 percent while in the national economy even last year it did not exceed 43 percent.

Much disorder is generated in the planning stage. Frequently the planners use outdated and unsuitable technical solutions for the basic purpose of the object. Work for technical and economic evaluation of planning solutions is at a low level and there is practically no variant planning. The quality of documentation is improving slowly. For example, last year the Gosekspertiza returned every sixth plan for reworking.

There is a lot that can be said about the reserves in the work of military planners. But special attention should be given to the problem of reducing the proportion of construction and installation work in the overall cost of the objects. Head planning organizations are not doing enough to implement a unified technical policy. For example, they do not devote the proper attention to the application of progressive three-dimensional modular, modular-set, and other modern structural elements.

[Question] Almost 2 years ago KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published your article which contained a concrete proposal—to introduce extensively the three-dimensional modular method of construction. Soon the Ministry of Defense had adopted a comprehensive target program entitled "Blok." How do you evaluate the course of its implementation?

[Answer] The experience that already exists in the application of three-dimensional-framework modules in the construction of industrial buildings speaks for itself: time periods for construction have been cut in half and labor productivity has increased by a factor of more than 2.5. The economic effect from just one project is measured in seven figures. Three-dimensional modules have also proved themselves in military construction projects. Nonetheless, up to this point the comprehensive program "Blok" essentially remains on paper. There have been no practical actions intended for the future and the introduction of the new method has the character of a prolonged experiment.

The most significant factor today, in my opinion, is the lack of plans for buildings and structures for various purposes made of three-dimensional construction elements. Up to this point the planners have not begun to develop a unified type of three-dimensional module for general military and housing construction.

The housing problem, as we know, is especially critical for the Ministry of Defense. Solving it by traditional methods will require either a considerable increase in the capacities of the enterprises and construction organizations or a reduction of other programs. Neither one is really possible. Increasing the proportion of large-panel housing construction, in which the degree of plant readiness does not exceed 50 percent, will not release surplus working hands for the construction site. A solution can be found only in a qualitatively different level of industrialization—plant readiness of three-dimensional modules can be increased to 75-80 percent.

[Question] Recently there have been many complaints about branch science. The entire national economy apparently has this problem in common. Military construction workers who solve the most difficult, frequently unique problems do not always set the tone in the development of construction technology. Why?

[Answer] The reasons for this lie both within science itself and outside it. First, until recently scientific organizations of the Ministry of Defense did not devote enough attention to this research. As a result, not only was the volume of research not great, but also the scientific-methodological level was low and there were not enough qualified specialists in this area.

Second, it is very important to formulate the scientific task correctly and promptly and to provide the proper conditions and effective control over its implementation. Alas, this has not happened. A comparison of the plans for scientific research work and the plans for standard and experimental planning and also plans for technical development of capital construction for this five-year plan show that many important problems are being developed without the proper interconnection.

And, finally, third, there is the poor introduction of the achievements of scientific and technical progress, which was discussed above.

[Question] Not so long ago on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA there was a discussion of issues related to the introduction of computers into construction practice. It would seem to be a particular issue, but behind it lie new forms of planning and organization of labor and management of the construction complex. What can you say about this?

[Answer] The application of computer equipment in the management of capital construction of the Ministry of Defense and in planning, unfortunately, has not yet influenced the effectiveness of construction. Even

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though significant financial and material resources have been allotted for the acquisition and operation of computers. A large number of specialists have also been employed.

In planning, for instance, computers are used mainly for drawing up estimates and doing individual calculation problems, and only up to 5 percent of the computer time is used for graphic work. The creation of an automated system of planning is in the embryonic state. In a word, the available means are being utilized ineffectively.

And if one considers the problem as a whole, the trouble here is the same: the lack of a unified technical policy in construction, which was discussed above.

[Question] And last. The changes that are to take place in the near future in capital construction are essentially radical. To what extent does the existing structure of military construction units correspond to this task?

[Answer] I think that the current structure basically corresponds to these tasks. Organizationally, it joins the construction workers, planners, and clients together. But the changeover to complete cost accounting and self-financing will require a search for new forms of interaction among all participants in the construction conveyor.

Experience in solving complicated engineering problems and the construction of unique objects and complexes has shown the possibility and expediency of creating planning-construction associations. In the future, when there are long-term developments and established five-year plans, it will be worth thinking about creating such formations also in capital construction of the Ministry of Defense in order to solve concrete target problems.

To put it more briefly, today as never before we need resoluteness, creative courage, and initiative both from out leaders and from the rank-and-file workers of military construction projects.

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Round Table on Problems of Pre-Draft Training
18010385a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 May 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Capt 2d Rank S. Turchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, and A. Strunin, VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA correspondent: "Problems of Pre-Draft Training. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA Round Table"]

[Text] Serious problems in the training of Soviet youth for military service were disclosed at the recently held 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress. One of these is the insufficiently effective work of DOSAAF schools, especially for the needs of the navy. This question became the main theme of a "round table" held in the editorial offices of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, which was conducted jointly with the journal VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA. Participants were Capt 1st Rank B. Tsybenko, chief of the administrative section of the main staff of the Soviet Navy; Capt 2d Rank A. Reshetov, deputy commander of the political unit on the cruiser "Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya"; Col A. Lukyanov, chief of the group for the administration of pre-draft training in the USSR Ministry of Defense; V. Strok, specialist on professional technical education of workers of branches of the heavy industry and transport; Maj I. Abushevich, section chief in the Moscow city military commissariat, and V. Burkov, chief of the Moscow Exemplary DOSAAF Naval School.

VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA correspondent: Fleet Admiral G. M. Yegorov, chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, made a particular reference at the defense society congress to the difficulties of bringing DOSAAF schools up to strength, and he cited impermissible cases of schools not employing their graduates in the forces according to their specialties. What are the reasons for these shortcomings, and how can they be eliminated?

V. BURKOV: One of the difficulties of bringing DOSAAF naval schools up to strength, for example, is that some of the regulation standards that regulate this question are out of date. Let us say that in view of the existing situation we should train specialists for the navy from among the working youth. But in Moscow, for example, almost all pre-draft young people attend an SPTU [rural vocational training school], a technical school, or a VUZ. So, the regulations do not take vital realities into account, and they are obviously impracticable. And so it turned out that 80 percent of the first intake of officer candidates this year consisted of those studying in an SPTU, and the second intake was manned almost entirely by SPTU students. But as a result of this quite a few questions arise that were not anticipated in documents. Let us at least look at one of these. A conscript studies 7 hours during the day in an SPTU, and in the evening, 4 hours in a naval school. Is such overwork justified? The following resolution of the problem seems possible to me. There are 3 months from the time the order of the Ministry of Defense concerning the

discharge of compulsory service soldiers and the callup of new replacements is issued to the end of the callup. These months could be used with success for training the young people in a navy school, because they are not attending an SPTU at this time.

A. LUKYANOV: A document prepared by a collegium of the Ministry of Defense jointly with other interested ministries is called upon to remove some of the criticality of bringing naval schools up to strength. It will resolve contradictions between the established practice of manpower acquisition and the outdated standards of formal documents by making it possible, in particular, to recruit SPTU students for DOSAAF naval schools.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: It is clear from reader mail that military commissariats permit many of the shortcomings in the acquisition of manpower for DOSAAF schools. They frequently send us young people who do not reach 18 years of age by the time of the regular callup (they will be inducted in 6 or 7 months). During this time, former officer candidates lose their skills, and they have to be sent for refresher training in the fleets.

B. TSYBENKO: And this should never be allowed. State money is wasted.

VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA correspondent: Here, for example, is a letter from the senior master of industrial education of the Kaluga DOSAAF naval school. He complains about the Oktyabrskiy Rayon military commissariat in the city of Kaluga, which sends even those under investigation for training at the naval school.

I. ABUSHEVICH: But the master of industrial education should himself participate in the selection of the personal records of conscripts. If he concerned himself with this, it is unlikely that something like that would happen.

V. STROK: I have a question for military commissariat workers. In an SPTU we prepare sailors in various fields for the ocean-going navy, the river fleet and the fish industry, but they are frequently not called up for the navy, or they train them in DOSAAF in other specialties. Does this make sense?

I. ABUSHEVICH: Not long ago at a joint meeting of workers of the Moscow city military commissariat, the DOSAAF city committee and representatives of vocational education in Moscow, we analyzed the possibility of training specialists for the VMF in related specialties. The Moscow naval school is today brought up to strength only from those conscripts who worked with electrical equipment during the course of education in an SPTU. We give them additional training in the "surface ship electrician" specialty. In addition, I want to explain that we could not always use SPTU river fleet sailors in the VMF, because, frankly speaking, there was virtually no military orientation in their education. They have to be

sent to a fleet training detachment. On the other hand, there is no need to send a specialist trained in a DOSAAF naval school to a training detachment.

A. RESHETOV: There is a striking difference between officer candidates of naval schools, especially in the first year of service, and those who did not go through such training. DOSAAF members, as a rule, are knowledgeable and capable young people. Although, of course, they also have gaps in their training for the service. Today's "round table", I admit, has opened my eyes to many problems. Apparently, we have to think about specific assistance to naval schools on the part of the navy.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: We have come to yet another problem—concerning the allocation of naval school officer candidates.

VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA correspondent: Both editorial offices receive a lot of mail in this regard. Here is one of them. Jr Sgt A. Skaysts informs the editorial office that he acquired a diver specialty in DOSAAF before entering the service, but that he now serves in a repair subunit, where the return from him as a specialist is significantly less.

As was noted at the 10th Congress of the defense society, according to data from the Black Sea and Northern fleets, military commissariats in the 1987 spring callup sent only 72 percent of the draftees who had completed education in a naval school.

Frequently, the naval specialties of draftees are not taken into account in the military commissariats of Moscow and Leningrad, Kiev and Minsk, and the Urals and Central Asia. In this manner, the requirement of the USSR Ministry of Defense concerning the compulsory assignment of graduates of DOSAAF training organizations to appropriate services of the Armed Forces according to their specialties is frequently violated, which results in substantial losses in material and morale.

B. TSYBENKO: All of this is explained mostly by the unconformity of our activities and the absence of close coordination. We have to assemble more frequently behind a "round table," as the saying goes, on the job, and not wait for an invitation from editorial offices.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: And, nonetheless, Boris Ivanovich, give at least one reason for the assignment of graduates of DOSAAF schools outside their specialties.

B. TSYBENKO: For example, last spring there were 110 graduates of DOSAAF naval schools in the newly conscripted replenishment who were not suitable for ship service because of health conditions. Naturally, they

were not employed in their acquired specialties. And the cause of this was the failure of the medical commission of the military commissariat to take sufficient care.

VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA correspondent: Even more critical mail comes in that is directed against Komsomol organizations. Here is a typical letter. Its author is Yu. Antonov, deputy chief for teaching and education at the Pinsk naval school. He writes: "Nobody changed the Komsomol sponsorship of the navy assumed in the 1920's. However, we do not receive any assistance. It would be useful if the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Young Communist League of the Soviet Union] undertook this specific task: participate in the acquisition of manpower for the naval schools and in the training and education of Komsomol officer candidates, and, after training, to issue the graduates Komsomol movement orders for the fleet."

B. TSYBENKO: Komsomol sponsorship of the navy has been consigned to oblivion in some places. It most often is for show. I will cite an example. There are ships that carry a Komsomol name: "Moldavskiy Komsomolets," "Mordovskiy Komsomolets," Ulyanovskiy Komsomolets," etc. But not even one Komsomol member from Moldavia, Mordovia or Ulyanovsk served on them in 1987. . . The previously operative system of statements from local Komsomol managers and chiefs has been forgotten. However, judging by everything, the VLKSM Central Committee also has not developed a clear position on ship sponsorship.

A. LUKYANOV: Apparently, it also would be worthwhile to invite representatives of the VLKSM Central Committee to our "round table."

VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA correspondent: We invited representatives of the VLKSM Central Committee. They promised to come, but. . .

A. LUKYANOV: I think this characterizes the attitude of the Komsomol management toward sponsorship of the navy.

A. RESHETOV: Today, educated and intellectually developed young people come to the navy, but they have virtually no practical experience. Under these conditions, training for the service and purposeful patriotic education of the graduates before induction has a special significance. This is our common task, and we have to resolve it together.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: Thanks to all of the participants of the "round table" for the discussion. We will await responses from appropriate authorities and officials to the questions that have been raised here.

Army Gen Shkadov on Transition From 'Mass' to 'Individual' in Military Education
18010371a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Apr 88 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Article by Army Gen I. Shkadov: "To Shape the Individual"]

[Text] In accordance with the requirements of restructuring the higher school, the training and education process in military academies and schools underwent significant changes in recent years. Substantial adjustments have been made to training plans and programs, which made it possible, if not to avoid completely, then to reduce significantly duplication in instruction, bring it close to the specific tasks being accomplished in the troop units and the fleets, and increase the practical thrust of training. Seemingly, this had to have an effect on the quality of the professional training of students and cadets, and especially on the growth of the level of their knowledge and abilities, which are necessary for confident fulfillment of the duties required by their duty assignments. Experience shows, however, that no fundamental improvement in the training of military cadres has yet occurred. The current position of the military school corresponds to a substantial degree to the state of secondary and higher education in the country, which is discussed quite directly and definitively in the documents of the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee plenum. Some VUZ graduates continue to have poorly developed political, tactical and operational thinking, ability to analyze complex situations and make well-grounded decisions, and ability to teach and indoctrinate their subordinates—in short, they are lacking precisely that which they need everyday in their practical activity.

This was seen especially clearly in the last state exam in the VUZes, including the military academies. In one of the leading academies, where I was chairman of the state examination commission, a certain portion of the students, for example, read off their answers on social sciences and operational art from hastily compiled summaries on exam pages, and did not report on their diploma tasks from cards they had developed themselves, but read them from a previously prepared text. It also happened that a supplemental question on a topic, that required not overly complex, but non-standard thinking, put the student in a state of confusion, and he did not find an answer. Analysis showed that in teaching tactics and operational art in the academy, and this is also characteristic of some other VUZes, a mass approach predominates, and lessons are conducted in a simplified situation, that does not encourage the students to think broadly and seek non-stereotyped solutions.

Numerous shortcomings were also revealed concerning other aspects of the training of students and cadets during the course of the state exam and subsequent inspections of the VUZes. The reasons for this vary, but

the main reason is that the fundamental task of restructuring the military school—a decisive turn from mass, "gross" teaching and indoctrination, to the individual approach in shaping an active and creative individual student and cadet—is still being solved timidly and indecisively.

Individual political and military indoctrination, as a rule, is not being planned either in the teaching and indoctrination processes, or in the individual working plans of the commanders of VUZ subunits, and if it is being carried out it is mostly haphazard, from case to case, and usually when a cadet or student has committed a disciplinary violation or received an unsatisfactory grade. And many officials, checking on, say, the organization of political, moral and military indoctrination in the student collective, are continuing, as in the old way, to assess the work according to the content of plans of general measures, and their fulfillment. If so many measures have been carried out in a faculty or battalion, and the maximum number of cadets have been "encompassed" by them, this means that everything is good, everything is at the necessary level. And what these measures added to the consciousness of the specific students, whether they had an effect on his attitude toward his studies and discipline, and whether they made him more active in social affairs is seemingly not so important. But this is precisely the main thing.

This can also be fully related to the organization of training, where the "gross" approach also basically predominates, and calculation based on some average student or cadet, capable of absorbing a certain amount of knowledge. But, you see it is not merely a class, not merely a platoon of faceless lieutenants that is graduated from a military educational institution, but each specific officer, whose very profession and future activity intend that he be a vivid individual and person, capable not merely of having a solid reserve of knowledge and skills, but also able to use them creatively in practice. Without a decisive turn in the training and indoctrination process toward the specific individual, and without taking into account his individual capabilities and creating conditions that facilitate the development and perfection of his inclinations and capabilities, it is doubtful that a modern officer as a creative individual can be trained. And today it is extremely important to train precisely such a military specialist. The correct path to this is the development of the individual capabilities of the student. In the modern world, as was emphasized at the February CPSU Central Committee plenum, this is the key direction for the forward movement of VUZ matters.

The well known Russian pedagogue K. D. Ushinskiy noted that if pedagogy wishes to educate a man in all respects, it must first get to know him in all respects. It is this "getting to know him" that in practice is frequently the worst sore point in education.

I do not wish to say that the modern military school has run out of able, capable teachers. Frequently visiting the VUZes, each time I "discover" for myself more and more commanders, political workers and instructors who possess the spirit of creativity and innovativeness, and seek effective ways of training and education. An ever growing number of VUZ instructors actively use in their practice the ideas and methods of the Donetsk teacher V. Shatalov, and other innovative teachers. And the greatest successes are achieved precisely by those who rely in their activity on work with the specific person, and development of his individual capabilities.

Col A. Dudoladov, a faculty chief at the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze, and colonels V. Akimov and A. Neklyudov, deputy faculty chiefs for political affairs in this same academy, for example, begin their study of the individual capabilities of the officers when they are still candidates for admission to the VUZ. They bring to light their political, professional and moral qualities, inclinations and capabilities, and after they are enrolled as students, carry out specific instructional and indoctrination work with each.

Examples of a similar approach also exist in other VUZes. However, many teachers still do not trouble themselves with the desire to get to know their subordinate more and more deeply, in order to develop his better qualities systematically and help him rid himself of everything superficial and negative. Is this not where the isolation from the students begins? And later the student himself, having become an officer, already in his own work, copying his former teachers, takes a formalistic and bureaucratic attitude toward his subordinates.

Why do individual teaching and indoctrination have such difficulty making their way. It is apparently because it is more laborious, and difficult, demanding of the military instructor himself high qualifications, experience and spiritual generosity. Does every commander and instructor today possess all this? But the main reason is the force of inertia and lack of desire to give up customary instruction mainly from the rostrum and chair. After all, it is always easier to hold a monologue than a dialogue, even more so if the goal of the dialogue must be not merely a discussion "about the subject," but improvement of the person of the co-discussant, deepening of his knowledge and convictions, and formation of moral purposes.

It also must not be overlooked that pedagogical skill is of exceptional importance in individual work. I recently became convinced of this again through becoming familiar with the experience of colonels A. Denisov and V. Materikin, senior instructors at the Military Academy of Armored Troops imeni MSU R. Ya. Malinovskiy. Each of these officers has his own teaching style. But, what links them is the fact that in their teaching they rely on assimilation of the subject through solving instructive problem situations, which turn the classes into sharp discussions and clashes of opinions, in the process of

which individual qualities and capabilities of the students are more vividly manifested, and the depth of their knowledge and ability to apply it in solving specific tasks are revealed. Apparently, such a principle should also be placed at the foundation of the training and indoctrination process: each teacher employs the individual approach in indoctrination and training, especially within the framework of his activity.

In this regard, the practice can hardly be called justified when the cadet platoon or training group is assigned to conduct individual indoctrination work for the instructor. This is nothing other than undermining the functions of the commander and political worker. The instructor must carry out indoctrination of the student or cadet in organic unity with his professional training. It is the art of the teacher to so organize the lesson that during its course each student is taught and indoctrinated individually, taking for himself the maximum that is useful.

However, when one visits classes one more often sees something else. Group, and not individual instruction predominates, preference is given to lectures and not to independent work and discussion seminars, and to classroom and not field exercises. This was noted at the Omsk Higher Combined Arms Command, the Kolomna Higher Artillery Command, the Eysk Higher Aviation, and a number of other schools. All of this leads to a situation in which today a substantial portion of the students, for example, in the combined arms and tank command schools, during the entire period of their schooling actually do not obtain comprehensive practice in controlling a real platoon in various situations.

One of the important tasks of the VUZ is to teach the student or cadet to acquire knowledge and skills independently. However, in the majority of the VUZes no changes in the organization of the training process have taken place. Many supervisors and instructors turned out to be psychologically unprepared to shift the thrust to independent work by the students, and to lessons according to individual teaching plans compiled taking into account the capability and level of preparedness of each. Moreover, this form of instruction is still not finding active support in the majority of military educational institutions, and in some has not even been placed on the agenda. And the political departments, faculty party committees and department party organizations here often take the position of observer, and await additional decisions and instructions. But what more instructions are needed, if documents on restructuring the higher school direct us to precisely such instruction, and if it is precisely this form of instruction that contains a substantial reserve for activating the creative capabilities of students and cadets?

The traditional system of examination, including state exams, according to previously prepared examination cards, in my view does not fully facilitate formation of the creative qualities of the officer's personality. First,

answers to the card cannot give a complete impression of the depth and amount of knowledge and the level of skills obtained by the student and his capability to think independently and justify his judgments, not to mention his ability to use them in practice. Second, the element of chance is not avoided. Third, practice shows that long before the exams the exam cards become known, and preparation for them amounts to compiling brief summaries of the questions. It is more advisable to conduct exams as conversations about the main areas of the subject, introducing into the conversation elements of active discussion, decisions and practical actions.

From the standpoint of developing skills of independent thinking, the system of reports by graduates defending diploma tasks is also ineffective. In practice these reports are usually read, and their so-called theoretical part consists, as a rule, of copying provisions, at times word for word, from manuals and textbooks. In many cases they contain none of the student's own thinking or judgments. Is this not a waste of time? Would it not be more useful if on a particular task the student would independently develop a paper and the instructional documents established by the assignment, and then defend his views, ideas, concepts and initial situation?

All of the things I have stated are elements of one problem, associated with the costs of switching from mass "gross" instruction and indoctrination, to individual. Numerous other problems have also piled up in the military schools that are holding back restructuring. I considered it necessary to discuss only the one that, it seems to me, must be solved in first priority, since its solution, which does not require special material expenditures, guarantees a substantial improvement in the quality of training of today's military cadres.

9069

Maj Gen Dorofeyev on Educational Reform in Military Academies

*18010371b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Apr 88 Second Edition p 3*

[Article by Maj Gen Yu. Dorofeyev, honored scientist of the RSFSR, professor, doctor of military sciences: "An Efficient System is Needed"]

[Text] In its examination of the problem of restructuring the higher schools, the February CPSU Central Committee plenum paid particular attention to the training of highly qualified specialists. Therefore, the discussion initiated by the paper on new approaches to using the potential of military science, and improving the effectiveness of scientific developments, and the rapid professional formation of our military cadres (see KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 1 March 1988) is of great interest to representatives of military VUZes. And here, as Col Ye. Zhuravlev correctly noted, an efficient system is needed.

The higher military school, which is intended to train specialists capable of constantly maintaining the combat effectiveness of the army at the necessary level, is lagging behind the demands of the times. In the first place I have in mind the "aging" of the most highly qualified specialists; i.e., the doctors and candidates of sciences. While agreeing with Col Ye. Zhuravlev in his main premise, we still believe that sending school graduates to academies before they acquire troop experience will not have the expected effect, especially if we are talking about specialists aspiring for the academic degree of candidate, and then even doctor of military sciences.

Nevertheless, the process of bringing in more younger scientific and pedagogical cadres must take place. We see this opportunity, based on our experience, through creating a definite system (unfortunately, no such system yet exists) for training the most highly qualified specialists.

How do we view such a system? The first stage is the school [uchilishche]. Here purposeful study of the cadets should be carried out and the most gifted, those who are working actively in circles of military-scientific society, and those involved in rationalizing and inventive work should be identified. It is necessary for the school Soviet to give them the appropriate recommendation, and for this to be taken into consideration in the cadre organs. Information about them, it seems to us, should be sent continuously to the academy, so that at the time of the scheduled selection it can be familiarized with the course of the service of the aspirants. Service with the forces, it seems to us, must be of two-three years' duration. This is sufficient to acquire definite troop experience, and to enter an academy at an age of no more than 25.

It is also very important, it seems to us, for a recommendation to be written up about the accomplishment of non-traditional tasks with a subunit (experience shows that up to 70 percent of students entering the academy were confronted with this while in the forces). Study in the academy should be profiled by faculty departments, which will fully meet the individual training of the specialist and develop his independence. And, if more interested attention will be paid to the work of students in the circles of the military-scientific society, and if they are given topics for study that will help reveal their creative capabilities, and at the same time be associated with planned NIR [scientific research work], we will be able to train young and promising scholars.

Graduates who have displayed an inclination toward pedagogical activity will continue military graduate study in the faculties selected by them. They will be 27-28 years of age. We see this military graduate study as continuing for four years. Passing the candidate's minimum requirement and development of the main postulates of the dissertation can be completed in two years, after which it would be useful to send the graduate student for one year with the forces, where he will be able to implement in practice his concepts and proposals. The

last year of study will enable him to complete work on his dissertation and prepare to defend it. Such scientific work will be truly topical and needed by the forces, and its author will become a specialist in a certain field of military affairs. Thus, he can become a candidate of sciences at the age of 31-32.

The graduate student who has completed his studies and is signed as an instructor in the faculty can improve his pedagogical skills in six month courses given by the faculty and develop the corresponding methodological materials. This will enable him over the course of one to one and a half years to get involved in his official duties, while continuously taking part in scientific work.

After five years of pedagogical activity, it is advisable to send an instructor for a year with the forces. Interpretation and testing of theoretical postulates by practice will improve the value of his scientific and pedagogical work, and enable him to acquire up to 60-70 percent of the

materials needed for his research problem and to request a position in a doctoral program. Completion of the doctoral dissertation, in our opinion, is possible by the age of 40.

Individual provisions of such a system have been partially tested by experience and gave positive results. The work of those faculties that have continuous ties with academy graduates was especially effective.

Here is one more important aspect. The modern specialist with high qualifications must know the methods of systems analysis, mathematical modeling, and stating and conducting experiments. Today this is a requirement of the times. A military scholar who lacks knowledge of modern computer equipment and the ability to operate it confidently is unthinkable. Only this will facilitate improving the scientific potential of the higher military school, restructuring the training process, and training highly qualified specialists for the army and navy.

9069

History of Adm Kuznetsov's Career, Development of Navy

18010398a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 May 88 Second Edition p 4

[Article by Capt 3d Rank O. Odnokolenko, entitled "The History and Fate of People's Commissar Kuznetsov." The first six paragraphs in the following text are the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction.]

[Text] We in the editorial office receive many letters insistently requesting that we discuss in greater detail the unusual and in many ways dramatic fate of the renowned military leader, Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov. Such requests have been made, in particular, by Lt Capt M. Lebedev and V. Klepikov from the village of Pravdino, Capt 1st Rank Retired A. Aleksandrovskiy from Leningrad, and others. The great deal of reader interest in the admiral's personality is understandable. After all, he was in charge of the navy during all 1,418 days of the Great Patriotic War and was a member of the highest agency of military leadership, the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and a participant in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of leaders of the allied powers. Under his leadership the navy was fully prepared on 22 June 1941 and on that day did not lose a single ship or a single one of the naval aircraft. Neither then nor on any other day of the war did the sailors allow the enemy to land a single party on our shore and not a single naval base was taken by the enemy from the sea. For many long days and months German divisions were drawn to the seaports of Tallinn, Odessa, Murmansk, Sevastopol...

After the war the memoirs written by N. G. Kuznetsov, "On the Eve," "On the Distant Meridian," "A Course Toward Victory," as well as articles in newspapers and magazines became widely known. So it turned out that he wrote considerably more volume and content about the navy, which he loved with all his heart, than is written about himself personally as the People's Commissar of the Navy during the most difficult time of war for the country.

For many years the name of N. G. Gerasimov seemed to be beyond the limits of glasnost. It was considered inappropriate to mention him in an official situation, and Kuznetsov's books and articles were published with great difficulty and with many parts edited out. Nonetheless, the interest in this individual, especially in connection with the navy, has always been high. It has been passed down as a legend from one generation of seamen to another that Nikolay Gerasimovich headed the Pacific Ocean Fleet when he was only a Capt 1st Rank and that he became People's Commissar of the Navy 13 years after he had completed the naval academy. There have been an especially large number of references to the so-called court of honor, which resulted in the demotion of the people's commissar to the rank of rear admiral and his being sent to the Far East. His return to his previous position in 1951 again stirred up

passions. And 5 year later Kuznetsov was again discharged from duty and placed in retirement—this time without the right to be reinstated.

Once in a letter to a friend he calculated, not without irony, that he had been a rear admiral twice, a vice admiral three times, an admiral twice, and he had also been the admiral of the navy twice...

"I was discharged from service in the navy, but it is impossible to discharge me from service to the navy," these words express the meaning of the last years of the life of N. G. Kuznetsov. [End of KZ introduction].

THE LESSONS OF SPAIN

Recently workers of the Arkhangelsk archive dug up an old birth certificate registry in which the following was written: a son Nikolay was born to the family of the peasants Gerasim Fedorovich and Anna Ivanovna Kuznetsov in 1904. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia gives a different date—1902. Thus it was made clear that the 15-year-old boy Nikolay Gerasimovich added the 2 years he needed—exactly the number needed to enlist as a marine in the Northern Dvina Flotilla.

...Almost 7 decades later the "deception" was discovered, and the biography of one of the youngest people's commissars of prewar times should be read with a correction. From the corrected data it emerges that he was in charge of the Navy when he was less than 30 years old.

The explanation for such a rapidly advancing career that was on the tip of everybody's tongue was that he was one of "Stalin's favorites." It is difficult to resolutely refute this or, conversely, to recognize it as the only reason. The young admiral with a fine physique and a manly open face—this is the way Kuznetsov was depicted on posters of the prewar period—evoked affection and could draw people to Kuznetsov and Stalin. But those who had worked with Nikolay Gerasimovich for many long years had a different point of view: he had never been the obedient person depicted on the posters. And although he was young, he had just as much right to the leadership post as any of the other candidates. By 1919, the time of his appointment, he had gone to Spain where, performing the duties of the naval attache at the Soviet embassy in Madrid and the chief naval adviser, he participated in the development of the combat operations of the republic navy.

This was a difficult mission if only because the leadership of the republic did not all hold the same position with respect to all issues. And Kuznetsov, who was essentially in charge of naval affairs, in keeping with his diplomatic status did not have the possibility of taking action—he could only persuade and advise. But the temperamental republicans, greedy as they were for sensational victories at sea, could not be so easily convinced that the main task of the navy was to provide

transportation and arrange for continuous supply of weapons and ammunition for the army. Almirante Nikolas (as Kuznetsov was called in Spain, although at that time he was only a Captain 1st Rank) coped with this task. Military cargoes were shipped continuously to Spain from the ports of the Soviet Union.

It can be said that not a single one of the Soviet admirals of that time had more experience in operations of such a scale than N. G. Kuznetsov. And others no less worthy of the position of People's Commissar of the Navy were swept away by a wave of persecutions...

Sometimes—curiosity is curiosity—the question is raised directly: who recommended Kuznetsov for such a high post? Perhaps some day the historians will be able to find an exhaustive answer to it. One thing is unquestionable: it was no accident that Nikolay Gerasimovich came to the attention of the high-level leaders, or at least Stalin was certainly not the first to notice his talents as a naval commander.

As early as 1935 the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, I. Kozhanov, wrote in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "... There is not doubt that he is the youngest captain of all the navies in the world. But the growth of this young commander has been continuous. I have repeatedly had occasion to criticize Kuznetsov's mistakes (and I will probably have more occasions to do this in the future). But while I criticize Kuznetsov, I admire him at the same time, for his mistakes do not come from idleness, complacency or laziness. These are mistakes of growth, young energy, and bold initiative which is not always accommodated within the framework of strict rules, mistakes of experience being accumulated. Kuznetsov is growing as an organizer."

The article came out on 7 November and was entitled "Captain 1st Rank."

From the manuscript of N. G. Kuznetsov, "Stalin's Death," 1973:

"When I was installed in the position of People's Commissar of the Navy in April, 1939, Stalin no longer appreciated objections and did not pay any special attention even to specialists. There had already formed around him a kind of thick cloud of toadying and servility, which made it difficult for people who did not occupy high positions to get through to him, and his opinions evoked no objections, even from his closest advisers. Young people like myself who had been raised to the heights by the waves of the 'turbulent period' of 1937-1938, having tried to 'have our own opinions,' were quickly convinced that our lot was more to listen than to speak."

The manuscript from which these lines were taken was never published; it was destined to lie in a desk drawer for many long years. But now with its help we can guess how difficult and complicated the relations were

between Stalin and the young People's Commissar of the Navy, who had his own ideas about the Navy. But the main thing was that he always defended them with conviction.

The memoirs of who who had occasion to serve with Nikolay Gerasimovich give us an idea about a lot of things.

From the memoirs of Adm V. V. Vinogradov, 1980: "An attractive and important feature of Nikolay Gerasimovich was his courage in raising a number of issues having to do with the construction of the fleet before the higher agencies, including such powerful ones as the Central Committee and the Soviet government...which I was able personally to witness at one of the meetings of the Main Naval Council which took place in December of 1938 in the Kremlin in the presence of Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov and Voroshilov."

Kuznetsov himself, when describing the events of that time, honestly admitted that he "did not even allow the idea that there could be any doubt about anything that came from him" (Stalin). Disputes arose mainly around naval issues, with which Kuznetsov, of course, was more familiar. Here he could not convince himself of the "correctness of the judgments even of the great leader Stalin."

As we know, the idea of a long-term program of ship construction originated in the central apparatus of the naval forces as early as the 1920's. An appreciable influence on its content was exerted at one time by the chief of the Directorate of the Navy [Upravleniye voyenno-morskikh sil], R. A. Muklevich, a proponent of a "harmonious" navy without any changes in the numbers of submarines or battleships. But they did not manage to realize the program at that time; industry was not up to it.

The war in Spain undoubtedly accelerated the course of events. It became clear that they could not do without a large navy. In 1937 at the suggestion of the People's Commissariat of Defense the government adopted a new ship building program. They began to implement it while the details were still being worked out. There was extremely little time left, and everyone understood that. It was decided to construct battleships, heavy cruisers, and ships of other classes. In the last year of the five-year plan it was suggested that an aircraft carrier be constructed.

In one of the chapters of the book "On the Eve" Kuznetsov had this to say about the program: "Perhaps now one should not judge the authors of the program too harshly for the fact that they included no battleships at all. It was not time for that yet. But one thing is unquestionable—it was necessary to give preference to more modern ships. Another thing is unforgivable: in the program they attached no significance to aircraft carriers. Let us imagine for a moment that they had managed

to complete the program in the second half of the forties. We would have had large squadrons of battleships, but...not a single aircraft carrier. Could they really get very far at sea?"

In Spain Kuznetsov was convinced of the role played by aviation. But he did not participate in the program for whose implementation he would later be responsible. At meetings the navy was represented by I. S. Isakov and L. M. Galler who, in Kuznetsov's opinion, could not fail to be aware of the significance of aircraft carriers. But they did not pay any special attention to them [carriers]. The proposal to increase the navy's funds was not accepted, and it was experience a critical shortage of ships of a number of designs. Subsequently, when Kuznetsov raised this question, Stalin remarked to Nikolay Gerasimovich:

"What, do you intend to do battle on the shores of America?"

It was impossible to prove to Stalin that the enemy's aircraft were equally dangerous whether they were 300 or 5,000 miles from their base. It was equally impossible to turn him away from his strange passion for heavy cruisers. When at one of the meetings Kuznetsov made some critical remarks about their design the leading worker of the People's Commissariat of the Ship Building Industry, A. M. Redkin, confidentially recommended that he not do that again because Stalin had promised to "have the head" of anyone who would stand in the way of the construction of heavy cruisers. Everyone was well aware of what such a promise meant, even as a joke. But this was no joking matter. Stalin was "painfully" serious about heavy cruisers.

One time after such a meeting in the Kremlin Kuznetsov came home and told his wife the following words he had heard from Stalin: "Why, Kuznetsov, do you always quarrel with me? After all, for a long time now the agencies have been asking me for permission to take care of you..."

Nikolay Gerasimovich himself did not suffer from the punishments of 1937-1938. This gave rise to all kinds of jokes. There were also those who, without checking their conclusions against the dates, accused Kuznetsov of giving the navy over to Stalin and Yezhov to be "torn to pieces." Let us recall that during almost all of 1937 N. G. Kuznetsov was in Spain, and in 1938 he was still only in command of the Pacific Ocean Fleet. And after that the fleet commander was not always able to stop the arrests.

Rear Adm D. A. Vershinin says: "In 1937 the 'Shchuka' on which I was serving as senior assistant went to sea for 3 months to engage in gravitational surveys. And that saved me. When I returned it turned out that almost all of my school friends had been arrested. The accusations were standard—a pest or a Japanese spy. Many others were also punished.

"I remember well the ship under the command of brigade commander Capt 1st Rank Kholostyakov. For some reason he passed through the area where the unit was located although none of us had been allowed into the meetings. Suddenly the door opened and, under escort, Georgiy Nikitich Kholostyakov came in and shouted to us loudly:

"'Citizen commanders! Tell my wife, please, that I am no longer a spy—just a pest...'

"...By the time Kuznetsov was appointed naval commissar the scope of the punitive measures had decreased considerably. Nikolay Gerasimovich was able to stand by his subordinates."

"At the beginning of April 1938 it became known," writes N. G. Kuznetsov in "On the Eve," "that People's Commissar P. A. Smirnov was coming to the Pacific Ocean. We were very glad about this. During the first few months of operation of the newly organized People's Commissariat of the Navy there were many problems. We thought that the people's commissar would help us to resolve these problems. But everyone was disappointed by Smirnov's arrival: he considered it his main task to 'purge the navy of enemies of the people.' As a result we lost many valuable workers."

Navy veterans, many of whom I met, assert that N. G. Kuznetsov "never offended the sailors." I was not able to find proof, but they say that Nikolay Gerasimovich sent to Moscow a list of people he could vouch for personally, and this saved many.

Rear Adm M. T. Protsenko says: "After they had removed Yezhov, Nikolay Gerasimovich returned from Moscow with the right to review the cases of those under suspicion. At that time, I—the commander of a detachment of wave control craft—was among them. In 1937 my brother was arrested for 'connections with an enemy of the people' and died in prison. (Later my brother was rehabilitated.) When we in the unit found out about the arrest we pushed aside work, guard duty, and alert duty. I felt that somebody was about to be arrested. Nikolay Gerasimovich at that time was registered in our party organization and I found an opportunity to go to him. After his intervention my case was closed.

"I know that I was not the only one Kuznetsov rescued like this.

"Many honorable people were actually broken at that time. And, of course, they are right when they say that Stalin was not the only one guilty of these punitive measures. He managed to gather a host of obedient people to carry out his will. But sometimes the voices rang out: what was being done by the people who would not sign the sentences? Why did they not stand up against Yezhov's men?"

"It is difficult for me to judge why. My generation is just now learning the truth about the events of those years. Previously the thirties were represented as 'the everyday life of great construction projects' and we truly believed that there was no more joyful, no happier time in the history of our people. In essence only now is the whole truth being told to us—about the camps for political prisoners where many Leninists were executed, and about the atmosphere of mistrust which pervaded the entire society, and about many other things which made us change our attitude toward these 'well-known' pages of history. This is why I am convinced that to get through 1937-1938, through the age of the 'cult,' and still remain 'an exceptionally upright person'—as Kuznetsov was called by those who knew him—is important evidence."

From the manuscript of Adm Yu. A. Pantilev: "A Person of Unshakeable Will," 1978: "When in the autumn of the first year of the war the fascists approached the walls of Leningrad and an obvious threat hovered over the city Stalin ordered that the entire navy and all military objects on the shore be prepared for complete destruction: 'Nothing should be left for the fascists.' Although Stalin signed this strange directive, he did not send it to us in the navy, limiting himself to a verbal order to the People's Commissar of the Navy, N. G. Kuznetsov. At that time we were drawing up a plan for destruction of the navy and all shore batteries. This was torturous work for all of the navy staff. The new commander at the front, G. K. Zhukov, wrote to Stalin that all navy leaders were panicking and were intending to destroy the entire navy and all the batteries. People in the government and the Central Committee were disturbed by this. N. G. Kuznetsov ordered the removal of Tributs (the commander of the Baltic Fleet during the war years), all members of the military council, and me, the fleet chief of staff. Of course, a sword hung over our heads. People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov informed Stalin that there was no panic in the Baltic. 'Fleet commander Tributs carried out precisely the order which you gave to me personally.' If Nikolay Gerasimovich had not said anything, and neither the People's Commissar of the Navy nor we in the staff had a copy of the document signed by Stalin, it would not have gone well for any of us during that frantic year of 1941.

"...I could give many examples like this of Kuznetsov's intervention on behalf of people he did not believe to be guilty. Such was this man's nature. Nikolay Gerasimovich was unable to protect from what were known to be unjustified reproaches."

Before the war Kuznetsov had occasion to visit Berlin—a stopover on his way to Spain. In 1945 the People's Commissar of the Navy flew into Berlin not as a transit passenger but as a participant in the historic Potsdam Conference of the leaders of the three allied powers—a "conference of winners." It was here on the eve of Navy Day that they signed an order evaluating the actions of the sailors during the war years: "...The navy completely fulfilled its duty to the homeland." And on 14 September

1945 the People's Commissar of the Navy was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. The ukaze was published after the defeat of militaristic Japan, but it is thought that Nikolay Gerasimovich made a weighty contribution to the victory as early as 22 June 1941—with ukaze No 1 for combat readiness. He was one of the few military leaders of that time who actually saw the military threat and took all possible measures.

The book by Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, "Reminiscences and Reflections," contains these lines: "Having accepted the position of Chief of the General Staff, because of the small amount of time available and the immense amount of work having to do directly with the Red Army, I was unable to become familiar with the condition of the navy. But I did know that navy personnel were well trained and that the commanders of the fleets and flotillas and their staffs were ready for combat operations..."

This was confirmed by the war. The navy, operating on the flanks of the Soviet-German front, would not allow the enemy to go around and strike the rear, and it was a reliable support for infantry troops in all strategic areas of rivers and seas. The naval forces operated actively and resolutely. They landed more than 110 naval operational and tactical landing parties, sank more than 1,300 enemy war ships and boats, and destroyed 5,509 aircraft. Of the nine largest strategic offensive operations of the Soviet Armed Forces, the fleets and flotillas of the Navy participated in six.

A COURT OF HONOR

After the war had ended another began almost immediately—it was called the "cold war." The former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition ended up on opposite sides of the barricade in the international arena. Taking into account the fact that both England and the United States are great naval powers, in the government they again raised the question of a large navy capable of going out into the ocean and protecting the homeland if necessary, not only in coastal waters but also in distant expanses. Because of the qualitative changes in weaponry, such a need could quite possibly arise.

The books and notes that were written and stored in N. G. Kuznetsov's personal archives make it possible to draw a conclusion about what he was doing at that time. He had to evaluate his combat experience and draw conclusions from his mistakes and omissions. The war had revealed even more clearly the vulnerability of large ships without reliable air coverage. It was also necessary to create an amphibious warfare fleet... According to the program proposed by the People's Commissar of the Navy, the first aircraft carriers of all classes were to have been included in the navy as early as the fifties. But it was necessary to consider the postwar destruction, the capabilities of industry, and the real international situation. Therefore, N. G. Kuznetsov noted, he was forced to

agree to the construction of a certain number of ships of prewar designs—just in order to provide for safety at the given moment and not end up completely unarmed...

And in general it was very difficult to resolve naval problems. Opinions regarding the future of the navy had not yet congealed. The cult of Stalin, which reached its apotheosis after the war, impeded the development of a unified view.

From the notes of N. G. Kuznetsov, 1972-1973: "Because of the fact that navy problems are fairly complicated and costly, his assistants (Stalin's) who were instructed to assist us tried in all ways to push them to the side. Thus Molotov was instructed several times to 'oversee' (us), but he tried to get rid of us as soon as he could.

"A. A. Zhdanov, following Stalin's instructions, supervised the navy before the war. He was even a member of the Main Naval Council. But when I spoke with him regarding this after the war, he clearly gave me to understand that he was busy with other matters and he could not 'stretch himself far enough to deal with naval problems.'

"Later, when Bulganin was in charge of us...he selected the worst path—not to honestly refuse, but not to decide anything either...

"This forced me up until the last years of Stalin's life to get through to him and ask that crucial problems be resolved in one way or another."

Moreover, it was even more difficult than it was before to express a viewpoint that opposed that of the "leader of all the people." Close by was Beria who had concentrated a great deal of power in his own hands.

One of the episodes from N. G. Kuznetsov's book "On the Eve" makes it possible to draw a conclusion about their relations.

On 3 March 1941 on instructions from the People's Commissar of the Navy, the Main Naval Staff gave an instruction to the fleets to open fire on intruders without any warning. Soon some German aircraft were fired upon over Liyepay. "After one of these episodes," writes Kuznetsov, "Stalin called me in. Beria was in the office along with him and I immediately understood which way the wind was blowing."

Subsequently Nikolay Gerasimovich found an enemy in N. S. Khrushchev who, as we know, under Stalin was a reliable executor of the other's will, and later himself frequently placed his own opinion above that of specialists. He and Kuznetsov had different views regarding the navy. But even before that was clear their relations were not very good.

Adm Yu. Panteleyev, who had worked during the forties on the Main Naval Staff, recalls that everything began with the meeting at which Stalin was the chairman where Kuznetsov reported on his plan for further construction of the navy. Khrushchev threw out remarks several times during the report. Finally Kuznetsov could not contain himself and entered into a decisive skirmish with him. Khrushchev recalled that this was Kuznetsov 10 years later.

But before that, in 1946, N. G. Kuznetsov received a "blow" from Stalin which bothered the intractable commissar more and more. Because of the results of an inspection of the Main Naval Staff by the military inspectorate, which, incidentally, did not include a single sailor, Kuznetsov was demoted. And almost a year later, according to a letter from the inventor Alferov to Stalin, in which it was stated that the People's Commissar of the Navy during the war had given the Allies blueprints of our secret torpedoes and secret maps with indications of approaches to our ports (he had in mind the routes of the allied convoys to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk), an investigation was initiated. The expert evaluation was assigned to Yu. A. Panteleyev and Ya. Ya. Lapushkin. During the course of it, it was established: the Allies already had such a torpedo and our maps were reprinted from old English maps translated into Russian. According to A. Golovko, who took the document to the Kremlin for expert evaluation, Stalin doubted the competence of the experts and ordered that Kuznetsov and other defendants be brought before a court of honor.

A day before the court Adm G. A. Stepanov, L. M. Galler, and V. A. Alfuzov gathered in the Kuznetsovs' apartment. The conversation revolved around one subject the whole time—what would happen the next day. Vera Nikolayevna, Kuznetsov's wife, tried somehow to relieve the tension. She did not succeed...

"What will happen to us?" Galler asked in dismay. He was a person who was no longer young and was probably more tired than the others of the unceasing interrogations. "Will they really strip us of our ranks?..."

For him, an officer of the old stripe who had devoted his entire life to the navy and so had no family, the service meant everything...

From the unpublished notes of N. G. Kuznetsov, 1973: "For 2 months we were in Moscow, being subject sometimes to polite questions and sometimes to 'devastating' criticism in a hall crowded with our former subordinates..."

Maj Gen of Justice P. D. Barabolya says: "The court of honor took place in the club of the main staff. Kuznetsov conducted himself confidently, with a sense of dignity. He tried to defend his subordinates as much as possible."

Rear Adm D. A. Vershinin says: "Certain of the documents used in the court had not been signed by Kuznetsov. Attention was drawn to this.

"If these comrades (Alafuzov, Galler, Stepanov),' said Kuznetsov, 'state that they reported to me and I gave them permission, then that is what happened. And it makes no difference at all whether my signature appears on the documents or not.'

"A reply followed:

"Why did you trust them so blindly?"

"If I did not trust them we would not have been serving together."

From the memoirs of Adm Yu. A. Panteleyev, 1987: "...We considered the entire court to be some kind of vile comedy since not a single one of the admirals who had been called to this 'court' was guilty of anything... An awkward situation was created. It was necessary to make a judgment and the guilt of the defendants had by no means been proved."

From the personal notes of N. G. Kuznetsov: "The next stage was when all of us were called in to the military procuracy and subjected to a kind of interrogation with the suggestion that we had to sign anything the investigator wanted us to. ...It was also suggested to me that I sign statements that in no way corresponded to the facts. Only a resolute announcement that I would never sign these lies made the investigator take my opinion into account."

But even the fact that the accusations were obviously fabricated did not disturb the investigation. Incidentally, after Stalin's instruction, nobody had any intention of revealing the truth. Alafuzov, Galler, and Stepanov would be convicted. Kuznetsov would be demoted to rear admiral and sent to the Far East.

Adm L. M. Galler was not destined to see freedom again. He lived until a couple of years before rehabilitation and died in the prison hospital on 12 July 1950. Stepanov would return with his health broken. Anfuzov throughout his life was unable to get rid of his impressions from prison. They will remain with him forever, like the aftereffects from shell shock.

And one more sharp turn of fate awaited Kuznetsov: in 1951 he was returned to Moscow, to the position of minister of the navy. The problem of the construction of an ocean fleet was resolved. In 1955 N. G. Kuznetsov would be awarded the title Admiral of the Soviet Union.

TRAGEDY IN SEVASTOPOL

N. S. Khrushchev's views on the navy were fairly extensively presented at one of the conferences that took place soon after the October (1964) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Rear Adm D. Vershinin was present at this conference and took notes on the statements.

M. A. Suslov said that, according to Khrushchev's idea, a ship should fly, dive, and float at the same time and should be armed only with missiles. Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskiy added: "Khrushchev declared a campaign against aircraft and tanks and the consideration of the program for construction of the navy was halted for many years. Khrushchev had an extremely negative attitude toward aircraft carriers. In his words, only Americans needed ships of this class."

After Stalin's death and the debunking of his cult, Nikolay Gerasimovich, like many others, counted on changes for the better. He tried to rectify the mistakes made in ship building during the years of his forced absence. It was at that time under his leadership that the first atomic submarine was created and tests were done on the first missiles. But solving problems was as difficult as before. The consideration of the program for ship building according to navy plans was constantly being postponed. When this happened one more time Kuznetsov could not restrain himself and expressed his opinion quite pointedly to Khrushchev. His nerves were almost shattered. In May 1955 he had a heart attack, which put Nikolay Gerasimovich in bed for a long time.

Apparently he understood that the relations that had developed with the leadership would not allow him to solve navy problems in the proper way. And his health had not allowed him to work at full steam of late. On 27 June 1955 N. G. Kuznetsov sent in his resignation to the minister of defense. He received no answer.

...For practically a half year N. G. Kuznetsov had not been able to perform his duties as the chief commissar (the consequences of the heart attack) when one night in Sevastopol Bay the battleship Novorossiysk (the former Italian battleship Cesare which had been received as part of the reparations) blew up, killing many people.

The incident with the Novorossiysk was a kind of springboard which was to cause the next turn in Kuznetsov's destiny.

N. G. Kuznetsov (from a letter to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee): "On 15 February 1956 I was called in by the former minister of defense (G. K. Zhukov—ed.) and within 5-7 minutes in an exceptionally rude way I was told of the decision to demote me to an enlisted rank and discharge me from the service without the right to be restored to my former position. Nobody ever called me in for a formal discharge after that. Some representative of the personnel administration (even when I was not there) brought the discharge papers and left them in my apartment. ...not being

completely informed about the reasons for my punishment, I asked to see the documents that pertained to me, but... I was not given this opportunity..."

For a long time the fate of the Novorossiysk was considered to be mainly N. G. Kuznetsov's fault. Nikolay Gerasimovich himself suggested that it was not caused by an acoustic mine. Preserved in his papers is the following entry: "...I looked into the circumstances of the catastrophe. At almost midnight, when the battleship was moored at its regular buoy and the crew was asleep, there was a strong explosion under the keel of the ship. The fleet commander responded to the alarm. After a certain amount of confusion, according to the fleet commander's report, they got the impression that the personnel were completely in control of the situation.

"...To this day it remains a mystery to me how an old German mine could remain there in working condition, and would then blow up at night and exactly in the ship's most vulnerable place. This is all just too improbable..."

From a letter from a former worker of the main navy staff, Rear Adm B. N. Bobkov: "The raising of the navy flag on the former Italian liner and its being renamed the Novorossiysk was a painful thing in Italy and this could have been the reason for the increased activity of Borgese (commander of the 10th special service flotilla of the Italian navy who specialized in underwater sabotage).

"Taking into account what has been said about and also the fact that the gates of the boom barrier at the entrance to Sevastopol Bay, where the battleship Novorossiysk was located, was not closed, I came to the conclusion that Borgese's saboteurs could get into Sevastopol Bay unnoticed in their submarine boats and attach the mine to the battleship.

"Indirect proof of Borgese's participation in the blowing up of the Novorossiysk liner is the award Borgese received following this event."

Also interesting, in my opinion, is the testimony of the writer N. Cherkashin (former worker of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA who had spent time in Italy). When he was visiting the Italian Naval Academy on the wall in the dining room he saw a picture of an explosion of the Novorossiysk by submarine saboteurs. This is discussed in the story "A Sea of Many Ships."

True, recently Cherkashin suggested another possible explanation of the destruction of the Novorossiysk. This time the reason was a "cluster of bottom mines" that had lain there silently but then were disturbed by an anchor, which caused the time counter to start working again. This version could also be accepted were it not for one circumstance. The battleship could not have disturbed the mines with the anchor since it was moored. And they did not throw out any anchors.

And so the story of the captured battleship was more or less clarified. Not with respect to the variants of the versions but with respect to the role it played in the fate of the "inconvenient" commander in chief.

This fact gives more of an idea of how N. G. Kuznetsov's retirement was carried out. Only 12 years later when the subject of an increment to the pension of Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolay Gerasimovich came up, it became known that he had been given a party reprimand. In order to remove it, it was necessary to write letters and explain that he knew nothing about the reprimand.

In the end the party reprimand was removed. It was recommended that they not "stir up" anything else.

[Following paragraph is the author's conclusion]. **Achieving as much truth and clarity as possible in his work, Nikolay Gerasimovich adhered closely to one policy: he never shifted his blame to others' shoulders and he said that he was prepared to undergo a great deal of punishment if it was deserved. He was mainly disturbed not by his own fate, but by the future of the navy, which he saw as capable of reliably protecting the homeland with ocean-going vessels and aircraft carriers.**

11772

Mutual Security Said to Require More than Parity
52001081 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 May 88 First Edition p 3

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences and Professor Maj Gen N. Chaldymov: "Security for All and Security for Each—From the Point of View of the New Thinking"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has recently begun to invite readers to give a brief analysis of materials that appear in the newspaper. Without trying to analyze specific articles from the last month, I would like to express my satisfaction with the appearance of the new rubric "From the Point of View of the New Thinking," illuminating the problems of the contemporary world. I would not only like to express my satisfaction, but also to offer reflections that are, in my opinion, directly associated with this rubric. Their theme is problems of universal security.

Every state is always concerned about its security, and alliances of states have frequently arisen for the joint and collective accomplishment of this task. But never before has mankind faced the dilemma of either universal security or a confrontation fraught with worldwide catastrophe.

Security has many aspects today. It encompasses all spheres of the life of society: economic, political, ecological and humanitarian. But its military aspect remains the most important. It is namely that one that we will consider.

The construction of a system of universal security includes three elements: devising the appropriate concepts with a regard for the realities of the times; propagating and incorporating those concepts at the level of both governments and the broad popular masses of the planet themselves; and, defining the specific steps for the realization of those concepts. The essence of the matter consists of building international relations not at the expense of partners or rivals, but rather with them.

The realities of the nuclear era require seeking security via the elimination of war from the life of mankind as a means of achieving political, economic, ideological or other aims. The political policies of every state should today be reduced to a point where instead of confrontation and an unrestrained arms race, trust and mutual understanding are reinforced, collaboration is expanded among states and their weaponry is reduced. And for this, we must refrain from views on the problems of national and international security left over from the past, reject the dogmas of "nuclear deterrence" and be rid of the mutual suspicion and mistrust that have accumulated over many decades of the cold war.

It is namely these ideas, born of the new political thinking, that comprise the meaning of the military policy of the states in the socialist community today. More and more people are coming under the banner of the new political thinking in other countries as well.

But with what difficulty, what squeaking the wheel of official policy turns in the Western countries. The new trends have just been noted there, but there are no radical changes as yet. This was demonstrated by the extraordinary session of the NATO Council that was held in Brussels in the beginning of March. Yes, voices sounded at the session calling for more stable relations with the USSR. But in its documents, the Soviet Union was once again called a "potential aggressor," and there was again discussion of the "Soviet threat."

The text of the statement adopted in Brussels says that the leadership of the North Atlantic bloc would like to foist unilateral disarmament on the socialist countries, break up the existing general structure of the Soviet armed forces and ultimately achieve military superiority.

Some of the speeches of official figures in the United States are evoking surprise at the least, such speeches as the one of the president at the Council on International Affairs in Springfield or some of the utterances of Vice President G. Bush. The spirit of the worst times of the cold war wafts from them. Some influential circles in Washington do not want to reject the conventional stereotypes, and the desire of monopolistic circles in the United States to establish a world order that meets their interests alone is still very strong.

This question is appropriate: is universal security possible in such a climate and is it worth talking of such security today, if the recidivists of anticommunism and militarism are constantly making themselves known in international relations and poisoning them?

Different answers are given. Some people, for example, feel that despite the presence of militaristic inclinations in the Western countries, no one wants to quarrel with them. I think that what is desirable here is being passed off as what is real, since the positions of those circles that have never ceased to put their trust in armed violence in relations with other countries and feel that it is fully legal and justified are still strong.

But if the source of the military threat is so powerful, is there any sense in the peaceful initiatives being advanced by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries? Can it be that only toughness, unyieldingness and uncompromisingness will force back the forces of evil? No, such judgments are also incorrect. To slam the door to negotiations in our infinite wisdom is not needed. We behaved that way at one time, but the anticipated impact was not achieved. Today wisdom in

politics consists of seeing and understanding the essence of contradictions and differences, not moving so far apart that it becomes impossible to hear one another.

Today it is possible to name no small number of representatives of the bourgeois world who are against war and in favor of peaceful co-existence and the establishment of close contacts with the peoples of the socialist countries. They back up the sincerity of their intentions with actions. All representatives of the bourgeoisie thus cannot be relegated to the ranks of the political reactionaries. This was not so before as well, and today it is simply a mistake. Enemies remain, of course—they are the representatives of anticommunist and militaristic circles that are ready to employ force for the purpose of annihilating socialism. And it is very important to see against whom and what we are fighting.

What to do, for instance, with the schism of society into opposing military blocs? They should be dissolved in the future. But for the moment, the presence of the blocs is a reality. This means that the possibility of co-existence must be sought. One means is mutual information on the intentions and actions of the parties for the purpose of removing mistrust and hostility in relations with each other.

Joint discussions of the military doctrines of both countries with the aim of a strategic re-orientation of armed forces away from the preparation and waging of war and toward averting them could play an important role in eliminating mistrust. Are such consultations possible? Yes, and this affirms the constructive nature of the meeting of the defense minister of the USSR and the U.S. secretary of defense that was held in Bern. Arm Gen D.T. Yazov, in evaluating the results of that meeting, noted: "These discussions give us grounds for declaring that in moving toward each other and taking mutual security interests into account, we can arrive at a positive solution to extremely complex military problems."

One can also refer to an analogous approach that held sway in Vienna at the recent constituent congress of Ergomas (the European Group for Researching Problems of Relations of Armies and Society), at which the author of these lines was present. The principal aim of this organization, as phrased by the president of Ergomas, Professor R. Zollem (FRG), consists of uniting national academic potentials—representatives of 21 European states were present at the congress—to devise concepts of European collective security. The aspiration of the representatives of academic circles of various countries to develop collaboration with all of the forces that are in favor of peace and progress and the desire to establish contacts for a better understanding of the policies of each state and to eliminate erroneous opinions about each other were revealed.

The task of concluding and observing bilateral and multilateral treaties aimed at legal consolidation of the principles of international security remains as important

as before. It should be taken into account herein that parity and equality, thanks to their very high levels, in and of themselves cannot save the world from catastrophic cataclysms. The problem of material guarantees for security—reducing the levels of arms to such a level that the very possibility of aggressive offensive operations becomes impossible—thus arises in all its magnitude.

A reliance on military technical means, on a desire to achieve superiority over other countries via increasing the quantity of arms, cannot lead to a strengthening of security in our times. On the contrary, this path inevitably leads to the opposition of one's own security against that of others and against international security.

The logic of the development of contemporary military policy is directly reduced to the theory and practice connected with the complete rejection of "nuclear deterrence." The concept of the "triple zero," assuming the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, arises from this in particular. This step can proceed after or in conjunction with a reduction in conventional weaponry. The states that take part in the Warsaw Pact have officially declared their readiness to hold consultations with the NATO countries regarding the size of the armed forces and arms of the two opposing blocs for the most rapid possible elimination of existing imbalances. As M.S. Gorbachev has said, we are offering to put our cards on the table, to exchange all data, evaluate it, uncover asymmetries in arms and troops and set about solving the problems.

But this process should be suitable. It is difficult to understand the logic of the FRG government, which has advanced the "New Concept for Reducing Conventional Weapons in Europe," according to which the countries of the Warsaw Pact are supposed to reduce their forces by 80 military formations equivalent to divisions, while the NATO states need only remove two such formations. And after all, the number of combat-ready formations (divisions and brigades) that NATO has is 1.5 times greater than the Warsaw Pact anyway. Such a position is an echo of the old thinking.

Our times persistently require other approaches. Every state, large and small, should comprehend its responsibility for ensuring the survival of humanity and make any contribution it can to creating a system of stable and universal security. After all, today security for all is security for each.

12821

Termez Meeting Welcomes Returning Troops
18010396a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 May 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Astafyev (Termez)]

[Text] Here on the left bank of the Amu Darya is where Afghanistan's land ends. It is a land that is abundantly watered by the sweat and blood of Soviet international

troops who came to help their neighbors in a time of difficulty. They have performed their duty honorably and now they are returning home.

A convoy of military vehicles moved onto the bridge of friendship that joins the Afghan city of Hayraton and the Soviet city of Termez. During these years many vehicles have crossed this bridge going south with various cargoes: food, medicine, fuel, and other necessities. The Country of the Soviets helped the friendly Afghan people in any way it could. In the autumn of 1986 Soviet military units were returning home across this bridge. Many residents of Termez remember those days. And here is another meeting. Under their Combat Banner the troops of the N motorized infantry unit are the first to set foot on the homeland since the conclusion of the agreement on Afghanistan.

The motorized infantrymen were among the first to come to the aid of the Afghan people at the request of their government in December 1979. Three of them—Maj Gen V. Kolesnik, Lt N. Kuznetsov, and Sgt Yu. Mirolubov were awarded the high honor of Hero of the Soviet Union. Nine people were awarded the Order of Lenin. And in all during these years orders and medals were awarded to more than 3,000 men of the unit, and some of them received awards two and three times. Rendering international assistance to the people of the neighboring country, they did not spare themselves in battle with the insurgents...

This happened on 23 April 1985. In combat with the superior enemy forces, the unit of Jr Sgt Yuriy Gavrosh remained to cover the departure of their comrades and ended up surrounded. When they were out of cartridges and the insurgents broke into their hut, the courageous soldiers blew up the insurgents and themselves with a mine. Those who died along with Gavrosh were Jr Sgt Vasily Kukharchuk, Pfc Aleksandr Vakulyuk and Vyacheslav Marchenko, and Pvt Vasily Muzyka, Nail Mustafin, and Vladimir Boychuk. During the course of the battle they killed more than 30 insurgents. When the men had driven the enemy out of the village, on their hut they saw the inscription: "Tell them at home. We are dying as heroes." All seven of them were posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star.

A month ago the political worker Lt Col O. Krivopalov showed me the unit's museum of military glory.

I was impressed by the number of photographs of troops and portraits done by military artists. Capt P. Bekoyev, Sr Lt P. Trofimov, Sr Sgt V. Kovalenko, Sgt Yu. Mirolubov... Some of them had died and many had been injured. Our people paid a high price so that the Afghan people could build their lives peacefully...

But it was not only with weapons in hand that the men of this unit fulfilled their international duty. They built an irrigation system in the region of Jalalabad, repaired water systems, participated in the construction of

"Vatan" children's homes in Jalalabad, Asadabad, and Gazni for Afghan children who had lost their parents, and they constantly rendered medical assistance to the local population...

...The convoy of military vehicles is approaching the Soviet shore. The manly faces of the motorized infantrymen, sunburned to the color of copper, can already be seen. And the shore is smothered with flags, banners, bouquets of flowers, and happy smiles of the greeters. Written on the banners are words like: "The homeland welcomes her sons!" "Glory to the Soviet international soldiers!" "Glory to the soldiers of the Fatherland!"

To the sounds of a triumphant march the convoy approaches the place of a meeting where podiums have been set up. On them are leaders of party and Soviet agencies, veterans of war and labor, friends and relatives of the troops, and workers of Termez. More than 1,500 residents of the city have come to this meeting.

Finally the convoy stops. Rising above the agitated hum of voices of the greeters comes the command: "To your vehicles!"

The unit commander Col Yu. Starov reports to the commander of the troops of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District, Army Gen N. Popov:

"Comrade General of the Army! The personnel of the unit, having fulfilled their international duty, have returned to the homeland."

Army Gen N. Popov congratulates the troops on their successful fulfillment of the order from the homeland and their return to their native soil. In response they repeat three times: "Hurrah!"

A town elder accompanied by girls in national costumes gives Col Starov bread and salt. Pioneers bring the troops bouquets of flowers.

Then the meeting begins. Participating in it are the deputy head of the propaganda department of the CPSU Central Committee V. Sevruck, deputy chief of the head political administration of the Soviet Army and Navy Lt Gen G. Stefanovskiy, the first deputy chief of the border troops of the USSR KGB Col Gen I. Vertelko, a member of the military council and chief of the political administration of the Turkestan Military District Lt Gen A. Ovchinnikov, and representatives of party and Soviet agencies and public organizations.

The meeting is opened by the first secretary of the Surkhandarya party obkom, S. Mamarasulov. The floor is turned over to the chairman of the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet P. Khabibullayev. He welcomes the troops and takes note of their courage in performing their military and international duty.

The USSR national anthem is sung.

The troops are welcomed by the leader of the cotton growing brigade of the 40 let Oktyabrya Kolkhoz in Termezskiy Rayon, Hero of Socialist Labor B. Rakhmanov; a member of the Politburo of the NDPA Central Committee, minister of defense of the Republic of Afghanistan, Col Gen M. Rafi; and a labor veteran and mother of the international soldier L. Vanyants. Speaking on behalf of the international troops is a delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference, unit commander Sgt S. Shcheglov, who has been awarded the medal "For Services in Battle."

The meeting ended. Immediately afterwards the soldiers were in the embraces of their friends and relatives, all those who had come to greet them on their native soil. Tears of joy, confused smiles, contradictory, emotional greetings... It is difficult to describe in words these first touching minutes of meeting. "How thin you have gotten; how you have grown up"—these are the words of a mother looking up at her almost six-foot-tall son. "This is your daddy," a young woman holding a chubby year-old boy says, not concealing her tears, and snuggles up to the shoulder of a senior lieutenant wearing an Order of the Red Star and medals on his chest.

The joy of greeting, the bitterness of loss, the happiness of the long-awaited meeting, the sorrow for those who

are not here now—all this merged together and united these people, both friends and strangers.

And then there was a festive meal. Those tables placed right on the shore of the Amu Darya were covered with everything under the sun. Residents of the city and workers of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the oblast tried with all their hearts to regale these dear guests. Fresh vegetables, fruits, dishes from Uzbek cuisine were enjoyed by all.

But first the people observed a moment of silence in memory of those whose lives were not spared in fulfilling the order from the homeland in battles for a bright future for the people of the neighboring country.

The emotion-filled hours of meeting passed quickly. The soldiers' duty called the motorized infantrymen back to their military vehicles. And now the convoy is passing through the hospitable streets of Termez. The troops will not be faced with more military concerns and days filled with combat training. Their service continues.

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Yelin Reporting on Withdrawal
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[Article by Lev Yelin: "Returning Home"]

[Text] In the first three months Soviet soldiers will leave 11 garrisons (18 are stationed there), and withdraw from 9 provinces of the country (there was a Soviet presence in 14 provinces on May 15).

"A timetable has been drawn up and will be kept to implicitly," the commander of the limited contingent of Soviet forces announced at a press conference in Kabul. Forth four-year-old General Boris Gromov from the city of Saratov on the Volga has commanded the contingent for about three years. He has been decorated with the Gold Star of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In replying to a question he underlined that the withdrawal of the troops was not a retreat, but the completion of an internationalist mission, on the one hand, and on the other, compliance with the Geneva Accords.

The opponents of national reconciliation make no secret of the fact that they are planning their own "farewell" to Soviet troops, and a bloody celebration for many Afghans. The Islamic holiday of Ramazan is now coming to an end in Afghanistan. On that last Friday of Ramazan, May 13th, the mosques in Kabul had a specially festive look. Tens of thousands of people gathered for namaz at the mosques. I mingled with the crowds on the square outside one of Kabul's oldest mosques, Poli-heshti. Suddenly the noisy crows broke up, as a funeral procession approached the mosque. Several battered military vehicles with cracks in their windscreens drew up. It was the funeral of an Afghan officer killed by the rebels.

That Friday evening, standing on the balcony of my hotel, I heard the unmistakable whizz of jet shells (JS). Then the sound was repeated. Both shells fell in residential districts of Kabul, leaving a trail of casualties behind them. The next morning I was woken by an explosion at 5:40. Later I learned that a lorry packed with dynamite had exploded at the bus stop in the Pul-i-Mahmud Khan area. Ten people were killed, and 13 injured, among them women and two children... When I arrived on the spot I saw gaping holes left by the explosion in the walls of two buildings.

The next day, May 14th, when President Najibullah was holding his press conference, five jet shells were fired on Kabul. The KABUL TIMES reported that in two districts of the capital nine rockets ready for launching had been found, plus another 15 in Nangarhar province. The news agency France Presse reported that counterrevolutionaries were dispatching fresh batches of Stinger and Milan anti-aircraft rockets, artillery and rocket launchers to fire on Kabul.

Maximum security precautions were taken in Kabul, and patrols stepped up.

A group of Soviet and foreign journalists visited a signal unit on the outskirts of Kabul that would be the last to leave Afghanistan. Its mission was to maintain communications right up to the last day. There were empty spaces in the parking lot: many army vehicles were away escorting the withdrawing troops.

"They fired from that village and that one too," the deputy commander of the unit, 39-year-old Lt. Colonel Vyacheslav Korolev told us.

Korolev also pointed to a black strip on a neighbouring hillside—it had been left by a missile fired at the unit.

"We are preparing our soldiers to expect the months ahead to be very hard ones. The situation is difficult. And crossing the Salang in the winter will not be easy. But the signals units invariably find themselves in the hottest spots..."

Late in the evening of May 14 several of us journalists flew to Jalalabad to the unit that was to be first to leave Afghanistan. At the Spinzar Hotel in the town, local community elders agreed to answer our questions.

In the corridors of the hotel I noticed the blue berets of the members of the U.N. inspection group. Lars Kerlstrup of Denmark explained that two groups of 25 members each had started work in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghan group included, apart from himself, representatives from Canada, Nepal, Ghana, Finland, Austria, and Fiji. ...The leader of the group was a Swede, Colonel Bu Pellnas. I found him.

"What is your job on May 15?"

"To observe how the Soviet side is implementing the Geneva agreements. Specifically, to see how it is withdrawing its soldiers from Jalalabad."

The key issue in a settlement of the situation around Afghanistan remains the discontinuation of outside interference in the internal affairs of the Afghan people.—From the joint Soviet-Afghan statement of May 15.

"And probably to watch how the column reaches Kabul? To see if there are any attacks by armed units?"

"That is a question I would rather address to the Soviet command..."

"A couple of days ago, one of the leaders of the armed opposition declared..."

"I will not reply to that question..."

"But it concerns you personally... He said that since the Peshawar Seven had sworn to fight against the Geneva agreements, he would regard the U.N. observers as enemies..."

"I would prefer not to comment."

The press conference of community elders began with a big explosion a mere 100-150 metres from the hotel.

"Jet shells like that," said the chairman of the provincial National Front, Kouat Khan, "are supplied to the bandits by the United States and other Western countries. Our children, women and old people are killed by them. If Pakistan were to block the road to the bandits in keeping with the Geneva agreement, and the United States were to stop arming them, there would be no more explosions."

"Gulbuddin Hikmatyar promised to arrive in Jalalabad as soon as the Russians leave. Who will defend the city: the Afghan army alone or the entire population?"

Not everyone was prepared to answer this question. Finally, the elder Kohala Abed rose.

"The Afghan army," he said, "is capable of defending the revolution itself. But should the need arise, we will all—old and the young alike—go into battle!"

...At six a.m. on May 15th the farewell meeting opened. It was addressed by the commander of the motorized infantry brigade, Colonel Yuri Starov.

The soldiers marched past the tribune. The band played an old military march. Colonel Pellnas remarked to me:

"I thought only the Swedes had melancholy military marches..."

There was a minute's silence in honour of those who had lost their lives.

The first column—more than one thousand soldiers—began its journey towards Kabul.

Some of the journalists hopped on board the armoured cars and, together with the soldiers, tried to catch the flowers and garlands thrown by the people of Jalalabad and neighbouring villages, who had come to see the Soviet soldiers off. Someone threw a melon. It was caught and promptly eaten.

The road taken by the military vehicles was lined with people shouting words of greeting; and so many children that one had the impression that the average age of an Afghan must be somewhere around 12. They ran after

the vehicles, throwing flowers to the soldiers, catching those thrown to them from another vehicle, and then throwing it back to the next one...

"They have fine children," private Victor Kirillov, who comes from near Pskov, shouted to me above the roar of the motors. Later, after spending several hours on the armoured car under the scorching sun, he told me that he is married and that he and his wife want a child. "Right away, the moment I get back" he told me seriously.

I half lay on my bullet-proof vest, which I had no inclination to put on (it weighs 18 kgs.) in such heat, and listening to Victor Kirillov, a scout and grenade thrower, and his fellow scout, sniper Andrei Volkov. They described episodes of the war in what is probably the most troubled of the border provinces, Kunar. They had operated as scouts and set up ambushes.

We had left Jalalabad at 7 in the morning, and we arrived in Kabul covered with a layer of white dust at four in the afternoon. We had passed canyons and ravines, looking up at the swiftly-flowing cool water of a mountain stream, and sharing the last drops from our overheated flasks. At times the soldiers would tense up looking into the overhanging mountain ledges. They had been in these parts and remembered the battles that had been fought here. Here and there in the ditches on the side of the road we passed the charred and damaged remains of military vehicles, lorries and buses. But we completed the journey without losses.

The units of the Soviet contingent and the Afghan army demonstrated that they are in control of the situation and that attacks of bands can be prevented. The artillery units standing guard along the road had only to open fire a couple of times, and as we passed we could see the smoke on the slopes. According to the men of this reconnaissance unit, those were probably pre-emptive shots, fired at places known from past experience, to be dangerous.

Then finally, the warm welcome in Kabul. Colonel Pellnas and his blue beret colleagues watched the column from their jeep. The first part of their mission had been successfully completed. The Soviet Union was abiding strictly by its obligations. The next morning—the farewell meeting in Kabul.

President Najibullah wished the Soviet soldiers a safe journey home. "Best regards and all our gratitude to the Soviet people from the people of Afghanistan," he said.

"Board your vehicles!"

The column set out for the Soviet border.

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